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Show Me the Money –
The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights Performance in Asia
Randall Peerenboom1
In recent decades, Asia has emerged as one of the most contested sites for the increasingly powerful
international human rights movement. Most notably, the heavily politicized Asian-values debate called
into question the universal pretensions of the international human rights regime.2 More fundamentally, the
experiences of Asian states over the last five decades challenged two widely held if somewhat
inconsistent views: first, that democracy was the key to economic growth, or, reversing the causal
direction, that economic growth would inevitably lead to political reforms, democratization and better
protection of human rights. Many Asian states experienced their periods of rapid growth under
authoritarian governments, including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia and still
today China. Moreover, while some Asian states have made the transition to multiple-party, competitiveelection democracy, others have not, including China, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Myanmar. Still others,
including Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia, exist in a limbo state variously described as soft
authoritarianism, semi-dictatorship, semi-democracy or nonliberal electoral democracy. Even those states
that have most fully embraced democracy, including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and more
recently Indonesia continue to interpret and implement human rights in ways that differ in important
respects from some Western liberal democracies, thus calling into question the extent to which they
should be described as liberal democracies.
In addition, the international human rights community has focused on several Asian countries
because of their poor records, especially in the area of civil and political rights, and in China’s case, also
because of its size and geopolitical importance. 3 Post 9-11, Asian states, several with large Islamic
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Although the term “Asian values” is not often invoked these days, concerns about differences in values
and other circumstances continue to surface in ongoing discussions about democratization, rule of law
and human rights in ways that belie the confident assertions that Asian values existed solely in the
minds of authoritarian government leaders. Larry Diamond, How People View Democracy: Findings
from
Public
Opinion
Surveys
in
Four
Regions,
at
http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/howPeopleViewDem.pdf (Jan. 11, 2001) (noting that
democracy does not always work, and that democratic consolidation depends on values for which
there are regional differences and most importantly on good governance and economic growth);
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populations, have come under scrutiny as the U.S.-led war on terrorism has renewed concern that some
states would reinstate or make greater use of broad national security laws to undermine the civil liberties
of not only suspected terrorists but political dissidents and even ordinary citizens.
Past discussions about human rights and values in Asia have been hampered by the lack of
reference to empirical studies to back up the strong theoretical, and in some cases polemical, claims being
made on both sides about the differences or lack thereof in fundamental values. Numerous multiplecountry quantitative studies have demonstrated significant regional effects with respect to
democratization, 4 labor rights, 5 women’s rights, 6 personal integrity rights, 7 freedom from government
intrusions, rule of law and good governance,8 and cultural values9 that in turn affect rights performance.10
Although these studies generally define Asia very broadly, frequently deal with rights in a very general
way and give rise to numerous methodological issues, they are invaluable in locating Asian countries
within a larger comparative context and in providing an empirical basis to sort out some of the claims
about Asian values. 11 They do not however generally measure the degree of variance in rights
performance within Asia, or attempt to explain the variation within Asia or why Asia as a region might
differ from other regions.
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Colorado, Boulder, June 20-21, 1997; David Reilly, Diffusing Human Rights (2003), paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31,
2003, at proceedings@apsanet.org (significant and persisting regional differences in personal
integrity rights).
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(summarizing various multiple country studies that find similarities on various dimensions of values
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autonomy versus social embeddedness, and hierarchy versus egalitarianism).
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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265 (1997) (finding that cultural values are important determinant of
rights and that Western nations have a higher level of freedom from government intrusion even after
controlling for GDP and other factors).
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For example, the World Bank’s good governance study includes in the East Asian region Brunei,
Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kiribati, North and South Korea, Laos,
Macao, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Papa New Guinea, Philippines,
Samoa, Singapore, Salomon Islands, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Vietnam. It
includes in the South Asian region Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Fortunately, the interactive database does provide information on individual
countries and allows one to select up to 20 countries for comparison. See Daniel Kaufmann et al.,
Governance Matters, Working Paper, World Bank (2003).
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In Part I, I provide an empirical overview of the performance of twelve Asian countries12 with
respect to physical integrity rights, civil and political rights, social and economic rights and other indicia
of quality of life including poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy, primary school enrollment,
government expenditures on education, health and military, quality of governance measured in terms of
regulatory effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, and law and order and
social stability as reflected in crime rates and the number of drug users, suicides, divorces and young
mothers.13 I also include several other countries from different parts of the world for comparison points,
focusing in particular on the United States and France.14
Notwithstanding shortcomings in the data and other well-known limitations of empirical studies,15
the empirical overview demonstrates a wide variation in Asia with respect to rights performance. At the
12

The twelve Asian countries include low, middle and high income states; a wide range of political
regime types; countries whose rights records vary widely; and countries from East and Southeast
Asia. Nevertheless, the group is biased toward (north) East Asia, does not include former Soviet
republics, and does not include the countries with the worst legal systems or human rights records
such as Laos, Cambodia or Myanmar.
13
I do not address the rights of the criminally accused. Nor do I focus directly on labor rights, rights of
women or environmental rights. For a discussion of labor issues in Asia, see LABOR LAW AND
MARKET REGULATION IN ASIA (Sean Cooney et al. eds., 2002). For women’s rights, see the UNDP
Gender-related
Development
Index
(2003
statistics
available
at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_196_1_1.html) and Gender Empowerment Measures
(2003 statistics available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_207_1_1.html). The
UNDP database also includes information on ratification of environmental treaties, use of energy and
other environment-related data.
14
I focus on the U.S. and France as comparison points to show that there are differences even within
economically advanced liberal democracies on a range of specific rights issues and to avoid overidealization of rights performance in Western countries. Although the U.S. and France score higher
on many rights indicators than many other Western countries, and thus are not representative of the
region as whole, they are far from perfect in many areas, especially when it comes to economic,
social and cultural rights. Furthermore, to the extent that legal institutions matter to the protection of
rights, the U.S. (a common law country) and France (a civil law country) differ in significant ways,
including with respect to constitutional review, and both have been influential as sources of legal
transplants. Several of the legal systems in Asia were modeled on the French civil law system.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has exerted considerable influence on the legal systems of Japan and the
Philippines, and has attempted to exert influence more broadly across the region, albeit with limited
success, through an aggressive human rights foreign policy.
15
On the advantages and disadvantages of empirical studies, see generally, Todd Landman, Comparative
Politics and Human Rights, 24(4) HUM. RTS. Q. 890, 896-897 (2002); Kenneth Bollen, Political
Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 1950-1984, 8(4)
HUM. RTS. Q. 567 (1986).
The philosopher Alastair MacIntrye has argued that differences in cultural narratives and the contingent
circumstances of countries preclude a science of universal human rights. ALASDAIR MACINTRYE, Is a
Science of Comparative Politics Possible, in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE 260-79 (1971).
Other critics argue that human rights attach to individuals, and aggregating violations and ranking
countries on a scale of better to worse may cause us to lose sight of individuals and the fact that any
violation is morally significant. John McCamant, A Critique of Present Measures of Human Rights
Development and an Alternative, in GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE
MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES (Ved P. Nanda et al. eds., 1981).
Choosing, operationalizing and measuring the dependent variable (rights) and the independent variables
(democracy, culture, institutional features such as judicial independence, etc.) have all proven
challenging. Attempts to develop a composite measure to rank countries for human rights
performance have failed because countries generally protect some rights better than others and
because of the controversial normative judgments inherent in prioritizing rights: how does one
compare the arrest of a person advocating democracy with the lack of medical care for AIDS victims
or children being sold into sexual slavery?
Accordingly, most studies attempt to measure one or more distinct type of right. Some types of rights,
however, are more difficult to measure than others, either because of problems operationalizing the
right or because of lack of data. Another concern has been that quantitative studies, reflecting the
normative biases of the Western-dominated human rights regime, have focused excessively on civil
and political rights to the detriment of other rights. The over-emphasis on civil and political rights is
particularly problematic for present purposes in that Asian governments often claim that they do
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same time, patterns emerge with respect to lower scores for civil and political freedoms among East Asian
countries and higher scores for social and economic rights as well as good governance, law and order, and
crime control and social stability. These patterns are consistent with aspects of the “Asian values”
platform that emphasize the importance, if not the priority, of social and economic rights relative to civil
better when judged by economic and social rights and measures that indicate a high quality of life
such as effective governance, political stability and low crime rates. This concern is echoed by those
who argue that “rights talk” is itself impoverished, and that rights must be complemented if not
supplanted by discourses of duties, needs, wants and/or capabilities. For a useful discussion of rights
and needs, see Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS:
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 87, (Austin Sarat &Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).
For capabilities, see Amartya Sen, Capability and Wellbeing, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE, (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); and Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 273-300 (1997).
Because rights may be subject to various limitations by law, and are implemented to varying degrees in
practice, rights must be scored along a continuum. Different researchers, however, operationalize the
same right in different ways, relying on a number of different factors to produce a composite score. In
producing a composite score, they inevitably rely on debatable assumptions about the relationship
between the various factors and how they should be weighted and aggregated. Similar problems exist
with respect to some of the most common independent variables. Democracy, for example, has been
defined and measured in a variety of ways. See Kenneth Bollen, Issues in the comparative
measurement of political democracy, 45(2) AM. SOC. REV. 370, 370-390 (1980); Gerardo Munck &
Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 (1)
COMP. POL. STUD. 5, 5-34 (2002); Christian Davenport & David Armstrong, Democracy and the
Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis of the Third Wave (2002), at
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/011/011002ArmstrongD.htms
In the end, quantitative studies are only as good as the data. Unfortunately, data on human rights
compliance is far from ideal. Many countries do not keep accurate records of human rights violations.
The coding of data often involves considerable subjective judgment, and in some cases has been
politically biased, especially in U.S. State Department reports that are less critical of allies than nonallies. Given the time-consuming nature of collecting and coding data, researchers have relied heavily
on a relatively small number of data sources. For an overview of various data sets and approaches, see
Michael Haas, Empirical Dimensions of Human Rights, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 43 (Stuart Nagel and David Louis Cingranelli, eds., 1996).
Perhaps the biggest drawback to most quantitative studies is that they are of limited use to policymakers.
Many studies, because of their generality, do not provide information that policymakers can act on.
Informing policymakers that war is the single biggest threat to human rights will not help them in
preventing or ending wars. Economic factors may be the next most important determinant of better
human rights performance, but economists have long been stumped as to how to ensure sustainable
economic growth. The inconsistency of results among empirical studies, especially when more
specific variables are introduced, further reduces their practical utility. For instance, studies of the
affect of FDI on human rights performance have been inconclusive: some have found that there is no
significant relationship, others have found that FDI is weakly or in some cases strongly associated
with better protection of rights, and some have found that increased FDI has a negative impact on
rights protection. In response to criticisms of excessive generality, researchers have attempted to test
the impact of more specific variables on a wider range of more specific rights. However, the
proliferation of studies has led to inconsistent and counterintuitive results.
Policymakers are also likely to be troubled by the normatively unappealing implications of many
quantitative studies. What, for example, is a rights-inclined policymaker to do with the studies
showing Islam to be negatively correlated with democracy and human rights protection? Should the
goal be to repress Islam, and if so how?
On the whole, quantitative studies are useful in demonstrating general patterns, but there are always
exceptions to the general rules. How the various factors will play out in a given country at a given
time often requires a more detailed qualitative study of that particular state. Qualitative studies are
able to provide a deeper and more nuanced account of economic, political and legal reforms and their
relation to human rights protection. As a result, they may provide a better sense of what the main
obstacles are to better rights performance in a particular context, and thus offer more useful policy
guidance.
This article should be read in conjunction with THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter called THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY], which provides a more detailed empirical
account by examining legal cases and social-political events relating to a range of specific civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights in the twelve Asian countries chosen here with
comparisons to the U.S. and France.
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and political rights. Similarly, the studies suggest that even in Asian democracies the liberal emphasis on
the individual will often take a back seat to collective interests and social stability. However, the wide
variation within Asia still requires an explanation.
Accordingly, Part II examines several possible explanations for the wide variation among Asian
countries. Clearly the story is complicated. A number of factors come into play, with some factors more
important for different types of rights or playing a different role in different countries or at different times
within a country. War, political regime type, the nature and level of development of legal institutions,
population size, colonial history, religion and cultural factors all play a role. In several countries, ethnic
diversity, religious tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or separatist movements have had a
major impact on rights policies and performances. However, consistent with the empirical evidence
globally, by far the most important explanatory factor is wealth, except with respect to physical integrity
rights for which international or domestic conflict is the biggest factor.16
The implications are twofold. First, comparing a lower middle income country such as China to
the U.S. makes about as much sense as comparing a piano to a duck. Countries should be compared to
other countries at a similar income level to determine how well they are doing given the available
resources. Second, there is considerable merit to the Bangkok Declaration emphasis on the right to
development and the Asian-values emphasis on economic growth. Although money is not everything, it
is essential. In the subtle and complex interplay of economics, politics, culture, law and institutions in
determining rights performance, what matters most is wealth. Put bluntly if somewhat too simply, if you
want better performance across a range of rights and indicators of human wellbeing, show me the money.
A Profile of Twelve Asian Countries, France and U.S. Across Different Types of Rights
The following tables provide a snapshot summary of performance on a variety of rights and other
indicators of wellbeing for the region as a whole as well as the countries in this study and other selected
countries from around the world as comparison points. The studies define variables in different ways, use
different data sets, rely on data from different years, are subject to wide margins of error, and so on. Thus,
the tables are no substitute for more in-depth studies. Nevertheless, they are useful in providing a general
sense of the range of difference within Asia on rights issues, and also in showing how Asian states
compare to other states in other parts of the world at similar stages of economic, political and legal
development.
Physical or personal integrity rights
Physical or personal integrity rights refer to the number of political prisoners, extra-judicial killings,
incidences of torture and arbitrary detentions. They are among the most basic of rights. They tend to be
subject to wide variation by year in a particular country because wars and political crises may arise or end
suddenly. For instance, despite thousands of complaints of torture and police brutality every year, the
U.S. had one of the best records in 1996, enjoying a level-1 ranking, indicating a country under a secure
rule of law, where people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture or political murders are rare or
16

William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 (2) HUM. RTS.
Q. 368 (1996) (GNP biggest contributor to civil, political, social and economic rights); GEERT
HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251 (2nd ed. 2001) (wealth was the main factor affecting
rights compliance, although individualism mattered in rich countries); Neil Mitchell & James M.
McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476,
497 (1988) (higher levels of economic wellbeing associated with better physical integrity rights
records); Steven Poe et al., supra note 7; Steven Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT’L
STUD. Q. 291, 310 (1999); Apodaca, supra note 6 (higher GDP associated with better performance on
women’s rights).
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exceptional. 17 However, it has since been demoted to level 2 because of the detentions of suspected
terrorists in Guatanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan and the secret arrests of more than 1300 persons
(many of them Muslims) in the U.S.,18 which constitute arbitration detention under the ICCPR.19 Level 2
indicates a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are
affected, and torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. Whether the U.S. will drop
further as a result of the reports of widespread torture of Iraqis and others captured in the war on terror
remains to be seen.
Notwithstanding ups and downs within countries, there has been no improvement globally in
recent decades.20
As expected, in the Asian region, there are more violations of personal integrity rights where
there is political instability, rebel insurgencies and terrorism, as Figure 1.1 shows.21 At level 4, India
remains a major trouble spot, mainly due to ethnic and religious tensions.22 China scores poorly because
of the high incidence of torture, arbitrary detentions and the arrests of democracy advocates, labor
unionists and others who oppose government policies.23 Indonesia, even after democratization, continues
to experience widespread personal integrity violations, consistent with the efforts to restore order in Aceh,
Papua and Maluku provinces and to prevent terrorism in the country. 24 South Korea performed
17

AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL 17, 19, 26, 43 (1998) (“There is a
widespread and persistent police brutality across the USA. Thousands of individual complaints about
police abuse are reported each year . . . . Police officers have beaten and shot unresisting suspects;
they have misused batons, chemical sprays and electro-shock weapons; they have injured or killed
people by placing them in dangerous restraint holds . . . . Common forms of ill-treatment are repeated
kicks, punches or blows with batons or other weapons, sometimes after a suspect has already been
restrained or rendered helpless. There are also complaints involving various types of restraint hold,
pepper (OC) spray, electro-shock weapons and firearms . . . . [V]ictims include not only criminal
suspects but also bystanders and people who questioned police actions or were involved in minor
disputes or confrontations.”).
18
Thomas Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond the Balancing
Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 59
(Campbell Public Affairs Institute, ed., 2003).
19
Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1
(2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure,
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 677 (2002).
20
James A. McCann and Mark Gibney, An Overview of Political Terror in the Developing World, 19801991, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15, 23-24 (Stuart Nagel and David Louis
Cingranelli, eds., 1996) (noting that political terror increased in the developing world in the 1980s
and finding that democracy does not by itself ensure low levels of terror); see also Reilly, supra note
7 (over the period from 1976-1996, the number of countries with the best score actually decreased,
countries with the worst score increased, while the mean remained about the same); Todd Landman,
Norms and Rights: A Non-Recursive Model of Human Rights Protection, paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31, 2003, at
proceedings@apsanet.org (noting increase in violations of personal integrity and torture between
1985 and 1993).
21
Linda Camp Keith & Steven Poe, Personal Integrity Abuse during Domestic Crises, paper presented at
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29-September 1,
2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/046/046004PoeSteven0.pdf. (also noting previous
studies found that civil war and then violent rebellion lead to more violations of personal integrity
rights).
22
Level 3 indicates extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution
or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial,
for political views is accepted. At level 4 the practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers.
Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level
terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. At level 5, the terrors of level 4 are
expanded to the whole population. The leaders place no limits on the means or thoroughness with
which they pursue personal or ideological goals.
23
For a more thorough discussion of China’s rating and the argument that a level-4 rating overstates the
problems, see Peerenboom, supra note 3.
24
Hikmahanto Juwana, Human Rights in Indonesia, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 15.
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surprisingly poorly in the mid-1990s, due apparently to violent protests by students and labor
organizations. At level 3, it is on par with Malaysia, which was ranked higher in 1996 but which has
suffered in recent years under the threat of terrorism and rising Islamic fundamentalism.
Vietnam scores higher than might be expected. Vietnam and Thailand both received a level-2
rating based on Amnesty International reports and a level-3 rating based on U.S. State Department
reports. Thailand however has recently experienced violent clashes between the government and Islamic
groups in some Muslim-dominated southern provinces, leading to the imposition of martial law in the
region.25 Singapore merits a level-2 rating, reflecting the use of defamation laws to rein in high profile
opposition figures and the reliance on tough national security laws and other nonliberal laws to crack
down on terrorists, people inciting ethnic conflict, drug traffickers and other criminals. Only Taiwan
receives the highest level-1 score.
Civil and political rights
The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability scale incorporates a number of indicators measuring various
aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights, including the right to participate in the
selection of government representatives and the independence of the media.26 The East Asia region falls
squarely in the middle among all regions as shown in Table 5.1. However, there is a considerable range
within the Asian region as indicated in Figure 2.1. Japan and Taiwan score reasonably well, though not as
high as the U.S. and France, whereas Vietnam and China are in the lowest 10%.
As suggested by Figure 4.1 and confirmed by other studies discussed below, civil and political
rights are closely related to wealth. Nevertheless, East Asian countries with a Confucian influence, even if
democratic, tend to do poorly relative to income level.27 Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong,
China and Vietnam all underperform relative to income.28 In contrast, South Korea, India, the Philippines,
Thailand and recently Indonesia outperform the average in their income class.29
Social and economic rights and other indicia of quality of life: poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy,
primary school enrollment, expenditure on education, health and military as percentage of GDP
China and other Asian governments have attacked the bias of the international rights community in
emphasizing civil and political rights over the right to subsistence, economic rights and the right to
development. How well do Asian states do on these other dimensions?
Figure 3.1 presents the UNDP rankings for social and economic rights in 2002 as measured by
the Human Development Index. The HDI measures the average achievement in a country in three basic
dimensions: a long and healthy life based on life expectancy at birth; education and knowledge measured
by adult literacy and combined primary, second and tertiary enrollments; and a decent standard of living
as measured by GDP per capita ($PPP). As one would expect, wealthier countries everywhere, including
25

Vitit Muntahborn, Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand Incorporated (Inc.)”, in THE RIGHTS OF
ASIANS TODAY, supra note 15.
26
The following data is obtained from Kaufmann et al., supra note 11, available at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/ [hereafter WB Good Governance].
27
A chart comparing a country’s performance to the average performance in its income class can be
readily generated using the World Bank interactive data set by simply selecting the country and the
good governance indicators, or selecting several countries for a particular indicator, and then selecting
“income category average”. As the chart is easy to generate but messy and hard to read without the
color-coding provided on the World Bank website, I have not reproduced the chart here. The chart is
available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/mc_chart.asp.
28
Other Asian countries that underperform relative to income are Myanmar, Laos and North Korea. Id.
29
Other Asian countries that outperform the average are Mongolia, Cambodia and East Timor. Id.
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in Asia, generally have lower (i.e. better) HDI scores, with wealth constituting a more important factor
than the nature of political regime.
However, the general composite measure fails to tell the whole story. Higher levels of economic
development and riches for some are consistent with an impoverished life for many others. Asia as a
region has been relatively successful over the last decade in reducing poverty, defined as the admittedly
minimalist standard of living on less than $1/day. In contrast, poverty in other regions has increased or
remained more or less the same.30
The performance of the East Asian region is somewhat deceptive in that the results are skewed by
the remarkable performance of China, which lifted 150 million, 12% of the population, out of poverty in
just nine years. To be sure, even within China, poverty remains an issue in some regions, with some 16%
still living on less than $1/day. Moreover, the income gap is growing, between urban and rural residents,
and also between those urban residents with the education and skills needed to succeed in a market
economy and those without them.
Table 1.1 shows three ways of measuring human poverty. One approach measures the percentage
of the population below the national poverty line defined as what that society considers necessary to
satisfy basic needs. Because countries will set the poverty line at different levels, a wealthier, welfareconscious country may have a high percentage living in poverty and appear poorer. The second approach
measures the percentage of the population below uniform poverty lines of $1 and $2 per day. Even when
adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), this income-based approach cannot fully capture actual
differences in the standard of living of poor people. While the first two approaches measure consumption
and income, a third approach measures the impact of poverty directly. The Human Poverty Index
quantifies poverty in terms of life expectancy, access to food and water, and education as measured by
literacy rates.
Ultimately, it pays to look at the three measures concurrently. For example, nearly half of the
Chinese population lives on less than $2 per day. But the actual standard of living in China, as measured
by the HPI, exceeds countries with higher income such as Iran and South Africa.
Asian countries vary dramatically in levels of poverty. India is by far the worst, though poverty
remains a problem in Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, China and Thailand. However, some countries are
doing fairly well in reducing poverty relative to the number of people with very low incomes, including
China, Philippines and Vietnam. Others have been doing poorly, especially Thailand but also Indonesia,
although Thailand has improved recently as a result of economic growth and a strong ruling party that,
while democratic, has followed the lead of other successful Asian states in focusing on economic rights
even if at the expense of civil and political rights.
Of course, relative and even absolute poverty remains an issue in developed countries as well.
About 9% of the population lives on less than $2/day in middle income Malaysia. Surprisingly given the
communitarian rhetoric of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s poverty ranking is out of line with its income
level and HDI ranking. The U.S. has the highest rate of poverty at 15.3% when measured by the UNDP’s
higher HPI-2 standard for developed countries. More than 17% of the population in the U.S. is incomepoor, with the poverty line set at 50% of the median adjusted household disposable income.31 While GNP
reached a historic high in the United States in 1990, having grown over 25% in a decade, child poverty
increased by 21% to where one in five American children lived in poverty.32 Almost 30% of the poor had
30

See Table 2.3, Changes in the Share and Number of People Living on $1 a Day Have Been Uneven, in
UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 (2003), p. 41.
31
United Nations Development Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT,
available
at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/hdr_2000_back1.pdf (also noting that more than one
in five adults in the U.S. is functionally illiterate).
32
John Gledhill, Liberalism, Socio-Economic Rights and the Politics of Identity: From Moral Economy to
Indigenous Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT 70, 72-73 (Richard Wilson ed.,
1997).
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no medical insurance in 1991, and somewhere between five and ten million Americans experienced
homelessness in the late 1980s.
Infant mortality, life expectancy and education
Table 2.1 on infant mortality, life expectancy and education demonstrates that wealth and war matter,
with richer and less war-prone Asian countries outperforming many African countries. Interestingly,
Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore outperform the significantly wealthier U.S. in terms of infant mortality
and life expectancy.
Vietnam and China, which score poorly on civil and political rights, do well on primary school
education, reaching levels comparable to that in the U.S. The Philippines and Indonesia, torn by domestic
strife and affected by the Asian financial crisis that increased poverty particularly in rural areas, suffer
from relatively high rates of children who do not receive a primary school education. Thailand performs
surprisingly poorly on this measure, reflecting perhaps the impact of the Asian financial crisis.
As Table 3.1 shows, Asian nations vary in the amount they spend on education, health and
military as a percentage of GDP. On the whole, Asian states spend more on education than health, usually
considerably more, with the exception of Japan. In contrast, France, the U.S. and Japan spend more on
health than education, reflecting higher medical costs but also greater wealth. No OECD country spends
less than 5% of GDP on health, whereas most developing countries spend only 2-3%. Given differences
in the size of the economies, the actual amount spent varies widely. The WHO estimates that $30-40 per
person is the bare minimum needed to provide basic health services. However, in 1997 the least
developed countries spent on average $6/person and low income countries $13, compared to $125 in
upper middle income countries and $1356 in high income countries. Making matters even worse in poor
countries, rural residents and those in the bottom 20% of income usually receive a disproportionately
small share of the medical services.33
The U.S. spends the most on the military in absolute terms, though at 3.1% of GDP, it trails
Singapore at a high 5.0%. Only Singapore spends more on military than education and health combined,
reflecting its security concerns as a small city state surrounded by larger states in which ethnic and
religious tensions might spill over into Singapore. Japan has the highest ratio of combined education and
health to military spending at 9.5 to 1. France, Thailand, and the Philippines spend more than five times
as much on education and health as on the military, the U.S. more than three times, South Korea more
than two and half times, India twice as much, and China slightly less than twice as much. Military
expenditures may be offset by arms sales. The U.S. claims 41% of the market in conventional weapons
sales, compared to 9% for France and 1.7% for China.
Income inequality and wealth distribution
While wealth undoubtedly affects the ability of governments to provide education and health services to
their citizens, how the government chooses to spend its money and how wealth is distributed among the
members of society are also crucial factors in the quality of life of citizens, especially the most vulnerable
in society. As Table 4.1 shows, Asian countries differ in terms of income distribution.34 However, they all
are more equitable than some of the worst offenders in Africa and Latin America. Indonesia, a low
33

34

United Nations Development Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, MILLENIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END POVERTY, available at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_overview.pdf.
Because the underlying household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected, the
distribution data are not strictly comparable across countries. The Gini index measures inequality
over the entire distribution of income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, and a
value of 100 perfect inequality.
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income country long associated with crony capitalism under Suharto, fares surprisingly well. Meanwhile
Malaysia, a middle income country often linked with Indonesia in the Asian-values debates, fares rather
poorly. The Philippines not only suffers from low income but also extreme income inequality.
Among the high income countries, Hong Kong, with its laissez faire economic policies and
colonial past, is the least equitable, though Singapore and the U.S. are not far behind. Conversely, Japan
once again scores best, with South Korea and France also doing relatively well.
The numbers may be deceptive in that they do not indicate long-term trends. China, once
relatively egalitarian, is now rapidly becoming more polarized.35 Similarly, Malaysia reduced the spread
in the 1980s only to see the gap widen rapidly in the 1990s.
Quality of governance
Asian governments that supported Asian values often unapologetically defended their heavy-handed
paternalistic ways by arguing that what mattered was the bottom line: economic growth, good
governance, clean and effective civil servants. Table 5.1 shows that the Asia region on the whole scores
relatively high on measures of good governance, including political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, with the exception of voice and accountability
where it ranked in the 50th percentile.
“Political stability and absence of violence” combines several indicators that measure the
likelihood that the government will be overthrown or destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means,
including terrorism. It is included as a good governance measure because political instability and violence
not only affect the ability of the ruling regime to govern but deprive citizens of the ability to peacefully
select and replace those in power. “Government effectiveness” measures the provision of public services,
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence and independence of civil servants and the credibility of
the government’s policy commitments. Whereas government effectiveness focuses on the institutional
inputs required to implement policies effectively, “regulatory quality” focuses on the policies themselves.
It includes measures of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision,
as well as perceptions of excessive regulation of foreign trade and business development, reflecting a bias
toward neo-liberal economic policies. “Rule of law” measures the extent to which people have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, how fair and predictable the rules are, and how well
property rights are protected. The indicators include perceptions of incidence of crime, the effectiveness
and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. “Control of corruption” measures
perceptions of corruption, the effects of corruption on business, and “grand corruption” in the political
arena.
Again, there is wide variation within the region, largely consistent with levels of economic
development, as indicated in Table 6.1. In the high income weight class, Singapore wins the gold in the
four main categories of good governance: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption. It also outperforms the region in terms of voice and accountability and political
stability, and the others in the high income category for the latter but not the former. The U.S. takes the
silver, with France and Hong Kong vying for the bronze. Although Japan scored well on infant mortality,
life expectancy, income equality and other quality of life measures, its scores on government
effectiveness and regulatory quality leave something to be desired. While it ranks relatively high in rule
of law, it fares relatively poorly on the corruption scale mainly because of grand political corruption.
While Taiwan outperformed the region on every measure, it underperformed relative to others in
its income group on every measure. However, if classified as an upper middle income country, as in the
UNDP rankings, then it would do quite well relative to others in its income class. South Korea
consistently outperforms the regional average. Moreover, relative to other countries in its upper middle
35

See Carl Riskin et al., Introduction to The Retreat from Equality, in CHINA'S RETREAT FROM EQUALITY
3 (2001) (“Seldom has the world witnessed so sharp and fast a rise in inequality as has occurred in
China.”).
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income bracket, it outperforms in the four main categories, although it lags behind in voice and
accountability and political stability. 36 Malaysia outperforms the regional average on the four main
indicators of good governance and political stability, though it underperforms on voice and
accountability. It outperforms others in its group on government effectiveness and slightly on regulatory
control, rule of law, and control of corruption, although it falls far short on voice and accountability.
Thailand, a middle income country according to UNDP standards but classified as lower middle
by the World Bank, outperforms the region and the average in the lower middle income class by a wide
margin on every dimension. China outperforms lower middle income countries in political stability,
government effectiveness, and rule of law; it does slightly better in control of corruption, and is about
average in regulatory quality. However, it scores much lower on voice and accountability. The
Philippines, also in the lower middle income category, scores high on voice and accountability, low on
political stability, outperforms the income average on government effectiveness and regulatory quality,
but lags slightly behind on rule of law and corruption.
In the low income category, India outperforms others in all dimensions except political stability.
Indonesia lags behind the regional averages and other low income countries on political stability, rule of
law and control of corruption, but outperforms others at its income level in voice and accountability,
government effectiveness and slightly in regulatory quality. Vietnam lags behind the region in all
categories except political stability. However, it outperforms others in its income class in political
stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption, though it lags far behind in
voice and accountability.
Law and order and social stability: crime rates, drug rates, suicides, divorces and young mothers
Lee Kuan Yew and other Asian leaders have often been critical of the high crime rates, rampant drug use
and social disorder in economically advanced Western liberal democracies. Rather, they champion
family and communitarian values, social stability and law and order. Tables 7.1 and 8.1 demonstrate that
there are significant differences in crime rates and other indicators of social order.
Crimes rates must be used with caution because of differences in the way crimes are defined, the
willingness of rape victims to come forward and other factors that affect the data reported, wide
fluctuations from year to year, as well as differences in the level of economic development, demographic
variables such as the percentage of rural population and youths, and other conditions that affect crime
rates. Notwithstanding such qualifications, the results are striking: Asian countries, especially in the
higher income brackets, tend to have much lower crime rates relative to their level of economic
development, industrialization and urbanization. For instance, the total crime rates for high income
countries France and the U.S. are twice to six times the rates in Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The
much higher crime rates hold across the board for property offenses such as theft and burglary, violent
crimes such as rape and murder (which are generally considered to suffer from fewer problems in
reporting and data collection) and drug offenses. The U.S. suffers from particularly high levels of violent
crime, especially rape. South Korean crime rates are also two to six times lower than fellow upper middle
income countries South Africa and Poland. The lower income countries such as China, the Philippines,
Indonesia, India and Vietnam have lower crime rates than the wealthier countries. Data collection is
particularly problematic in low income countries, making comparisons more difficult. However, it would
appear that crime and social disorder is a greater problem in India, the Philippines and Indonesia than in
China, Vietnam and Thailand, although Thailand, which has low overall crime rates, has a surprisingly
high murder rate.
Countries vary widely in how they deal with criminals. The U.S. also has the dubious distinction
of the highest rate of incarceration in the world, as well as some of the most severe punishments. In
36

See the chart at http://info.worldbank.-org/governance/kkz2002/sc_chart.asp.
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contrast, France and Japan have low rates of incarceration relative to their crime rates, and tend to place
more emphasis on noncustodial sanctions and in Japan’s case on rehabilitation. In general, however,
Asian states with the exception of Japan rely on heavy punishments.
Other indicators of social order such as suicide, divorce and young mother rates produce more
mixed results, less clearly tied to levels of wealth, as indicated in Table 11. Suicide rates are very high in
Japan, followed by France, and then a cluster of countries including South Korea, China, and Hong Kong,
followed by the U.S. and India. Thailand and the Philippines, perhaps because of religious influences,
have very low rates. The U.S. has a much higher divorce rate than other countries. The next country,
South Korea, with a surprisingly high rate, is still only half of that of the U.S. Singapore’s divorce rate is
relatively low. The birth rates to young mothers varies widely, with Indonesia, India and the Philippines
leading the pack, followed by the U.S. and Vietnam. In contrast, there are very few such births in France
and the East Asian countries Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea or China.
Provisional Summary
•
•
•
•
•
•

There is a wide variation within Asia in terms of human rights performance and other measures of
quality of life.
Asian countries, especially East Asian countries, tend to do poorly on civil and political rights relative
to others in their income group. Moreover, even the most democratic regimes in the region score
somewhat lower than the more liberal U.S. and France.
However, Asian countries tend to do much better, both relative to civil and political rights and also to
other countries in their income group, on economic rights and other quality of life indicators such as
education, infant mortality, life expectancy, law and order and social stability.
Asian governments also tend to outperform other countries in their income group on good governance
measures.
Each country does better in some respects than others. By selecting particular measures, one can
present either a positive or negative image of any country.
Rampant rights violations, grinding poverty, appalling misery and suffering, and daily assaults to
human dignity continue to exist in all countries. Each and every country could do better, and is more
and legally obligated to do better, in countless ways.

Accounting for Performance: An Overview of the Most Common Explanatory Factors
What accounts for the difference in rights performance in the Asian region? Quantitative studies have
shown that the protection of rights is influenced by, among other things, and in roughly descending order
of importance: economic development, with a higher level of development associated with better
protection of rights; international or civil wars, with war leading to more violations of rights; political
regime type, with democracies protecting rights better than authoritarian or military regimes; regional
effects, with Northern Europe and North America outperforming other regions, and with “region” often
serving as a proxy for religion and culture; population size, with larger populations leading to higher rates
of violation; and colonial history, with British colonialism linked to better rights protection. 37
Interestingly, ratification of treaties does not translate into better protection for human rights, and may
37

See generally, Steven Poe et al., supra note 16; Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisions for
Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are They More than Mere “Window Dressing,” 55(1) POL.
RES. Q. 111 (2002). As discussed below, the relative importance of the factors varies depending on
the right in question. In particular, wealth is less important with respect to personal integrity rights
than other rights.
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even have a negative effect, at least in the short term.38 In this section, I examine rights performance in
Asian in light of these factors.
Political stability: war, civil strife, ethnic unrest and terrorism
There are no international wars involving the Asian countries in this study at present. However, in the
past two decades, there have been skirmishes in the Korean Peninsula, an invasion by Vietnam of
Cambodia, border conflicts between Vietnam and China, skirmishes in the Taiwan straits, several
conflicts between India and its neighbors, including Pakistan and China, and violence in Indonesia and
East Timor. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been involved in some forty military actions, including wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, regime-changing invasions in Grenada, Panama and Haiti, military assistance to
rebel groups in Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and missile attacks on Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and
Sudan.39
In the near future, North Korea, having declared its intention to pursue the development of
nuclear weapons, remains an area of concern. The Taiwan independence issue could be explosive. Chen
Shuibian’s playing of the referendum card to boost his flagging chances for reelection and his
commitment to a constitutional overhaul have increased tensions considerably. In addition, there continue
to be a number of border disputes in the region. The signing of a multiparty agreement regarding the
Spratly Islands in 2000 has eased tensions, although recent moves by China to develop natural gas in the
South China Seas and by Vietnam to renovate an airport on the Islands and run tours for tourists have
once again raised concerns. The strengthening of ASEAN may also help defuse conflict in the region as
member states become more economically interdependent.
The main sources of instability in the region are domestic. Nepal and the Philippines continue to
battle rebel insurgents. Indonesia and East Timor are struggling to maintain stability in the wake of East
Timor’s declaration of independence and the downfall of Suharto. The rise of terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism in Indonesia have further challenged the newly formed democratic regime’s ability to
maintain social order.
India remains one of the least stable countries in the region, in part because of potential
international conflicts with its neighbors but also because of domestic threats arising from ethnic strife,
terrorism and general discontent associated with poverty and an ineffectual government.
China remains relatively stable, although the potential for instability should not be dismissed
lightly. Sources of instability include terrorist threats by radical groups in Xinjiang as well as a broader
group of Xinjiangese and Tibetans who desire independence or at least greater autonomy. Frequent
massive demonstrations by disgruntled farmers, laid-off urban workers and pensioners who are unable to
38

A study of 176 countries from 1976 to 1993 found that signing the ICCPR or even the Optional
Protocol allowing individuals to raise complaints had no impact on state’s actual behavior after
controlling for other factors known to affect human rights implementation. Overall human rights
protection among member states was no better than among non-member states, all else being equal.
Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It
Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior? 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999). Another study examining
compliance with respect to torture, genocide, fair trials, civil liberties, and women’s political equality
in 166 countries found similar results. Although countries that ratify human rights treaties usually
have somewhat better compliance ratings than countries that do not (without controlling for other
factors), noncompliance is rampant. Moreover, countries with the worst human rights records
sometimes have higher ratification rates than countries with better human rights records. In some
cases, treaty ratification is associated with worse human rights ratings, leading the author to conclude
that the “relatively costless step of treaty ratification may thereby offset pressure for costly changes in
practice.” Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
1941, 1978 (2002). Nevertheless, a country’s ratification of a human rights treaty generally
strengthens the hand of domestic and international rights advocates and may therefore contribute to
norm change over time. Thus in the long term, the human rights situation may improve.
39
See http://www.uwec.edu/grossmzc/interventions.html.
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obtain their retirement benefits from moribund state-owned enterprises or poorly funded welfare
programs also have the government on edge. In addition, China’s impressive economic run over the last
twenty-five years is threatened by a high percentage of bad loans that could undermine the banking
system. Judging from the harshness of the crackdown, the ruling regime also perceives advocates of
democracy, certain religious groups such as Falungong and other social groups as potentially
destabilizing.
The U.S. received a relatively poor political stability rating in the World Bank 2002 study,
ranking just higher than China and lower than South Korea. The lower ranking reflects the rise of
terrorism and the possibility of retaliation for the aggressive U.S. militarily policies in Afghanistan, Iraq
and elsewhere in the world.
In addition to the threat from North Korea, South Korea has experienced ongoing violent clashes
with students and workers. As a result, its political stability rating is the same as that of Vietnam and
lower than the regional average and the average for its income class. Vietnam’s political stability rating
appears to reflect the concern that the authoritarian socialist system is simply not sustainable, and yet the
regime may not be able to manage political transition to a more stable form of government.
Malaysia has been relatively stable. However, the threat of terrorism and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, as well as concerns about the transition of power now that Mahathir has stepped down,
have given rise to worries about political stability. Nevertheless, it remains relatively stable, as does
Thailand. While Thailand has a history of coups, and the military remains strong, it has emerged as one of
the more stable democracies in the region. Although terrorists have been captured in Thailand, terrorist
activities are primarily oriented toward other states. The authorities have clashed with Islamic separatist
in southern provinces, however, resulting in more than 100 deaths and the imposition of martial law in the
region. In Taiwan, the violence that erupted after the closely contested presidential election in March
2004 demonstrated the public is deeply divided, increasing the potential for domestic political instability.
Hong Kong remains stable, despite recent mass demonstrations of several hundreds of thousands
to protest the ineffectual rule of Tung Chee-hwa, an economic recession, proposed national security
legislation required under the Basic Law and limited political reforms. The pace of democratization in
Hong Kong and China remains an issue, and there will inevitably be tensions between Beijing and Hong
Kong under the novel one country, two systems approach. Nevertheless, there is little chance of political
instability given Hong Kong’s politically cautious, business-minded citizenry and the fundamental reality
that Hong Kong is part of the PRC.
Japan, France and Singapore all rank high on political stability. However, Japan’s sending of
soldiers to Iraq has created tensions at home, with many citizens concerned that Japan’s increasing
presence in U.N. peacekeeping and nation-building operations runs afoul of constitutional limits on the
military.
More generally, the war on terrorism has resulted in threats to civil liberties in all countries. In
addition to hurriedly passing a series of anti-terrorist laws, the U.S. has pressured other countries in Asia
to beef up their national security laws, often dangling the bait of bilateral trade benefits as an inducement.
Ironically, prior to 9-11, the U.S. State Department and Western rights organizations routinely criticized
Asian countries for cracking down on dissidents, insurgents, terrorists, and others who threaten social
order on the ground that the life of the nation was not at stake as literally required under Article 4 of the
ICCPR to justify the derogation of civil and political rights. Yet surely the threats faced by many Asian
countries have been and continue to be more serious than the threats currently faced by the U.S. Isolated
acts of terrorism, deplorable as they may be, are not likely to bring the world’s mightiest military power
to its knees. In any event, rights advocates worry that U.S. pressure will set the clock back in societies
that have fought to eliminate or restrict the use of national security laws to harass political opponents.
Economic development
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Some Asian governments have cited their economic record in defending the need to rule with a strong
hand. On the whole the Asian region has done extremely well in achieving economic growth, particularly
compared to other regions. However, the level of development varies widely in Asia.
The U.S. leads the pack with GDP/capita (PPP) of US $34,320, as indicated in Table 9.1. Also in
the high income category are Japan, Hong Kong, France, and Singapore in the $22,000 to $25,000 range.
South Korea and Taiwan are in the upper middle category, with PPP levels at slightly less than half of the
U.S. and about two-thirds that of the high income Asian countries. Malaysia and Thailand are in the
middle, with PPP levels about one-fifth to one-fourth that of the U.S., and one-third of rich Asian
countries. China and the Philippines are in the lower middle group, with one-eighth of the per capita
wealth of the U.S. and one-sixth of that of rich Asian countries. Indonesia, India and Vietnam fall into the
low income category.
As the scatterplots in Figure 4.1 graphically portray, level of development is clearly related to
better protection of human rights. The correlations in Table 10.1 demonstrate that the relationship
between wealth and human development40 and good governance is extremely strong.41 The relationship
for voice and accountability is also strong, and statistically significant. Although statistically significant,
the relationship between personal integrity rights globally and GDP is weaker. This is due to police
violence and other acts classified as torture even in rich countries, and because rich countries also react to
war, terrorism and political stability by limiting civil and political rights and detaining suspects in ways
that are considered arbitrary detention under international human rights standards.42
Wealth then explains the brunt of variation in human rights performance around the world,43
strongly supporting the arguments calling for greater emphasis on the right to development and more
assistance from wealthy western liberal democracies. Of course wealth is not the only factor or the most
determinative for all rights in all cases. Some countries in each income group beat expectations while
others fall far short. Of 174 countries, 97 scored higher on HDI, the indicator of social and economic
rights, than their GDP ranking, while 69 scored lower.44
40

There is also a strong relationship between wealth and women’s rights as measured by the UNDP’s
Gender Development Index (GDI) index (r=.93). The GDI index is highly correlated with the HDI
index (r=.999). The GDI is a composite indicator that measures the average achievement of a
population in the same dimensions as the HDI while adjusting for gender inequalities in the level of
achievement in the three basic aspects of human development. It uses the same variables as the HDI,
disaggregated by gender. Given the high correlation, the scatterplot for GDI is virtually identical to
that for HDI. Even the regional correlations differ only slightly as indicated in Table 10.1.
41
Three variables (Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption) are so highly
correlated (Pearson r > .91) that they appear to measure the same thing. Reliability analysis confirms
this (alpha = .97), and so the variables have been standardized and combined into a single good
governance scale.
42
Keith, supra note 37 (citing eight studies and concluding that “empirical evidence has consistently
show that higher levels of economic development reduce political repression,” but finding that the
factors affecting personal integrity were in order of importance a large population, civil war, a change
in democracy from lowest to highest level, international war, provisions for fair trials, GDP, and
provisions for public trials). See also Christian Davenport, “Constitutional Promises” and
Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties
are Suppressed, 58(3) J. POL. 627 (1996) (impact of economic development minimal in his study and
three others); Conway Henderson, Conditions Affecting Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT
RES. 129 (1991) (democracy, inequality and economic growth were statistically significant predictors
of political repression, though level of economic development was not). Economic growth might be
an important indicator for personal integrity rights because people are less likely to take to the streets
when their material standards are improving. In contrast, economic downturns, particularly at low
levels of development, frequently result in regime change. Adam Prezowski & Fernando Limongi,
Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 (2) WORLD POL. 155 (1997).
43
See supra note 15. Although table 4.1 presents simple correlations without controlling for other
factors, many of the studies cited in note 15 do control for other factors, and still find a strong,
statistically significant relationship between wealth and rights performance.
44
Human Development Report 2000, supra note 31.

15

16

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ___

There are also strong regional differences that weaken the correlation between wealth and civil
and political rights. East Asian states with a Confucian heritage and Middle East states with an Islamic
tradition are less supportive of civil and political rights even if wealthy. Latin American states, with a
history of corporatism, patron-client relationships, corruption and large income gaps, and African
countries, with traditions of collectivism, strong ethnic affinities and more recently dysfunctional and
corrupt leadership, are also less supportive of civil and political rights.
Cultural factors then play a role in some contexts and with respect to some rights.45 To be sure,
cultural traits are also closely correlated with wealth, as well as such demographic factors as age,
education, rural-urban ratios and occupation.46 Moreover, the relationship between wealth and human
rights performance in Asia and the Middle East is consistently strong except with respect to civil and
political rights. This supports the view that there is a culturally based antipathy to liberal values that
explains the variance. In contrast, the relationship between wealth and all types of rights is consistently
weak in Latin America and Africa, suggesting that the culprit is corrupt and dysfunctional governments
that serve the rich, if they serve anyone, at the expense of the general populace.
Finally, it bears noting that rights performance of any country may deteriorate rapidly because of
war, economic stagnation, natural disasters or problems like HIV/AIDS, though again poor countries are
likely to be suffer disproportionately.
Whereas most studies use GDP as the independent variable, some studies have found that
economic growth rates are also important to protection of rights. Again, there is significant difference in
terms of long-term growth rates in the region. Only six—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore and China—experienced sustained growth over 5% for the period from 1965 until 1995.47
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia grew more slowly, at around 3.5% per year. Seven countries, including
North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines and Myanmar, averaged less than 2%
growth. Growth rates in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam increased during the 1980s and
1990s up until the financial crisis.
45

Notwithstanding the clear correlation between wealth and good governance, at least one study has
found that cultural values are more predictive of rule of law and good governance than GDP. Licht et
al., supra note 8. The study found that countries that emphasized autonomy and egalitarianism had
higher levels of rule of law, accountability and less corruption, whereas countries that emphasized
embeddedness and hierarchy had a lower level of rule of law, accountability, and worse corruption.
In short, English-speaking and Western Europe scored significantly higher than other regions. The
authors suggest that cultural orientation in East Asia may make it more difficult to implement rule of
law, restrict corruption and increase accountability or that “good governance” in Asia may differ in
some respects from “good governance” in liberal democratic Western countries.
Good governance in Asian countries no doubt differs in significant respects from good governance in
rich, liberal democratic Western countries once one examines in more detail the broad variables of
rule of law, accountability and corruption. Nevertheless, Asian states have outperformed other regions
in terms of rule of law on the same World Bank good governance scales used by the Licht et al.,
suggesting that culture may not be as important at least in Asia as the authors suggest. More
generally, the study suffers from a relatively small number of countries (N=45 to 53), and the
sequencing in which variables were tested for affect may have led to culture appearing more
significant than it is. Relying on the same IBM data, Hofstede found that wealth was the main factor
affecting rights compliance, although individualism mattered in rich countries. See supra note 16.
46
See Hofstede, supra note 16 (wealth biggest factor with respect to individualism versus collectivism,
the power distance index which measures the extent to which less powerful members of society
accept that power is distributed unequally, and uncertainty avoidance which measures the extent to
which people are comfortable in unstructured situations); Geert Hofstede and M.H. Bond, The
Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth, 16 ORG. DYNAMICS 4, 4-21
(1988) (Confucian work dynamism related to economic growth); Smith et al., supra note 9) (GDP
strongly correlated with autonomy versus conservatism, and egalitarianism versus hierarchy).
RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES (1997) (GNP/capita strongly correlated with both wellbeing
versus survival, and secular-rational versus traditional authority).
47
Henry Rowen, The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia, in BEHIND EAST ASIAN
GROWTH (Henry S. Rowen ed., 1998).
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Several points bear noting. First, the period of rapid growth generally occurred under an
authoritarian regime. However, not all of the authoritarian regimes in the region have succeeded in
achieving high growth rates (e.g., Myanmar, North Korea). Nor have all the democracies (e.g.,
Philippines, India). Regime type is not as important as the stability of the regime and variations within
regimes.48 In particular, regimes that are market-oriented, dominated by technocrats, and relatively free
from corruption are more likely to be successful.
Second, of the Asian countries that have experienced sustained growth, most have enjoyed legal
systems that comply with the standards of rule of law at least in their handling of commercial matters.
Although the political regimes may not have been democratic and the legal system may not have provided
much protection for civil and political rights in some cases, the Asian countries that experienced
economic growth generally scored high with respect to the legal protection of economic interests. A
survey of economic freedoms in 102 countries between 1993 and 1995 found that seven of the top twenty
countries were in Asia.49 Economic freedoms include protection of the value of money, free exchange of
property, a fair judiciary, few trade restrictions, labor market freedoms and freedom from economic
coercion by political opponents. With the possible exception of China, the legal systems of the six
countries that have achieved highest economic growth measure up favorably in terms of economic
freedoms and rule of law, particularly with respect to commercial matters. In contrast, the legal systems
of the lowest performing countries are among the weakest in the region. The data for Asian countries is
consistent with the general evidence from other countries that demonstrates that rule of law is necessary if
not sufficient in most cases for sustained economic development.50
Third, all else being equal, authoritarian regimes tend to outperform democratic regimes at
relatively low levels of economic development.51 Thus, promoting democracy in very poor countries may
be putting the cart before the horse.
Fourth, some Asian countries, including China, may not yet have reached the level of
development that makes it likely that there will be a transition to democracy, and even if there were, that
democracy would be sustainable.52 While democracy proponents often claim that authoritarian regimes
are particularly vulnerable to economic downturns, so are democracies, at least at relatively low levels of
growth.53
Fifth, when the conditions for a durable or stable democracy are not present, the transition to
democracy often impedes economic development, at least in the short term.
Sixth, economic development is not sufficient for political reform and the emergence of
democracy. Countries may develop economically and not become liberal democracies, at least for a
considerable period. Hong Kong and Singapore are good examples.
Seventh, higher levels of prosperity and economic development are likely to lead to a growing
demand for democracy—Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong are good examples.
Whether or not economic development is the cause of democratization, in the long term, economically
advanced countries are likely to be, and to remain, democracies.
Finally, as discussed in the next section, democratization does not necessarily lead to an
improvement in human rights.
48
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As for the relation of growth to rights rather than to democracy, high growth rates may in the long
term lead to better protection of rights as a society becomes wealthier, and may in the short term diminish
popular discontent and opposition to government policies, thus reducing the need to suppress political
dissent or take harsh actions to curb social protests. But higher growth rates are also consistent with rising
inequality and political oppression, as the experiences of several Asian countries demonstrates. As
indicated in Table 11.1, China and Vietnam have enjoyed the highest growth rates in recent years,
explaining to some extent the legitimacy of the authoritarian governments and the relative political
stability despite severe restrictions on civil and political rights. Similarly, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, South Korea and Malaysia enjoyed high growth rates during their authoritarian years, although
growth rates have tapered off in recent years as the size of the economy has grown and because other
factors such as the affect of the Asian financial crisis. India’s growth rate has been relatively high, though
only half of that of China. Asia’s other developing country democracy, the Philippines, has struggled
economically, posting some of the lowest rates in the region.
In addition to levels of development and growth rates, researchers have studied the effect of FDI
and foreign assistance on human rights. Unfortunately, such studies have been inconclusive.54 Taking a
look at the region, China clearly receives the most FDI, and indeed was the leading destination in the
world for FDI in 2002. In terms of FDI as a percentage of GDP however, the countries ranked as follows
in 2001, Hong Kong 14.1, Singapore 10.1, Vietnam 4.0, France 4.0, China 3.8, Thailand 3.3, US 1.3,
South Korea 0.8, India 0.7, Malaysia 0.6, and Indonesia –2.4.55
Consistent with the general studies, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from these figures
for the Asian region. In most cases, foreign businesses pursue their own economic interests. While there
may be some diffusion of norms, in some cases the nouvelle riche working in foreign enterprises tend to
be conservative defenders of the status quo.56 Moreover, foreign investors themselves have very different
records on labor rights issues. In China, large multinational companies from the U.S., Europe and Japan
provide similar treatment to employees as in their own country. However, investors from other countries
in the region often engage in abusive practices.57
While FDI may stimulate growth and provide much needed jobs, it can also contribute to
financial crisis. The Asian financial crisis clearly resulted in lower living standards in many Asian
countries. In Thailand, poverty levels jumped from eight percent in 1996 to twenty percent in 1998 as a
result of the financial crisis, eliminating much of the progress made in last twenty years. Some 800,000
school children and college students were forced to drop out of school; social problems such as
alcoholism, depression and suicide increased; immigrants were no longer welcome; and trafficking in
children and prostitution increased.58 Fortunately, Thailand has now recovered from the financial crisis,
and regained or even improved on pre-crisis levels for human development and other rights.59
Although studies have reached different conclusions about the impact of foreign aid on human
rights, the impact seems to be limited in most cases.60 What is abundantly clear from such studies is that
aid is more often determined by the strategic, commercial and political concerns of the donor rather than
given out of pure altruism. At minimum, it is safe to say that the human rights record of the recipient is
rarely the determining factor, and that there is a significant gap between a rhetorical commitment to
democracy and human rights and the deliverance of aid and the pursuit of other goals that undermine
54
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democracy and human rights.61 Looking at the amount of ODA received (US millions) and the rate per
capita in the region, India clearly leads in the total amount of aid received, although Vietnam, Indonesia
and the Philippines have higher rates per capita: India 1705/1.7; Indonesia 1500/7.0, China 1460/1.1,
Vietnam 1439/18.1, Philippines 577/7.5, Thailand 281/4.6, Malaysia 27/1.1, Hong Kong 3.6/0.2;
Singapore 1.0/0.5. Again, no straightforward conclusions seem to flow from these numbers, although the
relatively poor civil and political rights records of Vietnam, China and Indonesia suggest that aid alone is
not an effective lever for changing government policies in that area.
Political regime: democracy, authoritarianism and their mixed offspring
Many studies using a variety of methods and definitions find that democracy reduces human rights
violations. 62 However, the studies tend to assume a linear relationship: marginal improvement in
democratization leads to a similar improvement in protection of human rights. Yet many qualitative
studies have found that democratization has not led to better protection of human rights in the countries
studied.63 Despite the much vaunted third wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, regimes that
combined meaningful democratic elections with authoritarian features outnumbered liberal democracies
in developing countries during the 1990s.64
A number of quantitative studies support the disconcerting results of the qualitative studies by
showing that the third wave has not led to a decrease in political repression, with some studies showing
that political terror and violations of personal integrity rights actually increased in the 1980s.65 Other
studies have found that there are non-linear effects to democratization: transitional or illiberal
democracies increase repressive action. Fein described this phenomenon as “more murder in the middle”
– as political space opens, the ruling regime is subject to greater threats to its power and so resorts to
violence.66 More recent studies have also concluded that the level of democracy matters: below a certain
level democratic regimes oppress as much as non-democratic regimes.67
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supra note 7 (over the period from 1976-1996, the number of countries with the best score actually
decreased, countries with the worst score increased, while the mean remained about the same);
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Rights, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Philadelphia, August 28-31, 2003, at proceedings@apsanet.org. See also Davenport & Armstrong,
supra note 15; Keith, supra note 37 at 129 (democracy has only minor impact on personal integrity
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Another study found finding that democracy leads to improvement in human rights performance
within the first year of holding elections, but then that is followed by increased repression in
following years. On the other hand, while repression increases in the year of a regime change from
democracy to authoritarianism, repression then decreases in the first year after the authoritarian
regime takes over power and in subsequent years. Moreover, the study distinguished between
democracies, authoritarian regimes and mixed regimes –i.e. those regimes that score in the middle of
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Democracy consists of different elements or dimensions, and thus most studies use a composite
index. The Polity IV measure increasingly favored by researchers is a 21-point scale made up of five
components: competitiveness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of participation, executive
constraints, openness of executive recruitment and regulation of participation. Other composite measures
of democracy include civil liberties, freedom of press, minority protection and so on. Which elements
matter the most for the protection of human rights?68 Is there a sequencing effect that would recommend
increasing political participation before increasing constraints on executive, or vice versa? de Mesquita et
al. found that political participation and limits on executive authority are more significant than other
aspects, but that there is no human rights benefit at all until the very highest levels of political
participation and executive constraints are achieved. However, these levels require moderate progress on
each of the other subdimensions. In short, “there is no significant increase in human rights with an
incremental increase in the level of democracy until we reach the point where executive constraints are
greatest and where multiple parties compete regularly in elections and there has been at least one peaceful
exchange of power between the parties… Put more starkly, human rights progress only reliably appears
toward the end of the democratization process.”69
Policymakers are again faced with morally ambiguous results. Democracy appears to be related to
both economic growth and human rights, but the human rights benefits of democracy may occur only
once democracy is consolidated. Moreover, all else being equal, authoritarian regimes tend to outperform
democratic regimes at relatively low levels of economic development, while democracies are unstable at
low levels of development and susceptible to collapse when economic performance suffers. 70 This
supports the views of several Asian leaders who argue that economic growth should come before
democratic reforms.71 On the other hand, advocates of a growth-first approach may be troubled by studies
showing that IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs lead to more repression, at least in the
short term, although the long-term results are variable.72 At minimum, policymakers should strive to
avoid sacrificing the short-term interests of the poorest members of society at the altar of long-term
growth by adopting relief measures to protect the most vulnerable.
the Polity III index, as most new democracies are likely to do. Transitions from an authoritarian
regime to a mixed regime lead to more repression in the year of change, a decrease in the first year,
and then an increase in the second year. In sum, the results are consistent with the argument that
human rights improvements are consistently obtained only in full democracies. See S.C. Zanger, A
Global Analysis of the Effect of Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-1993, 37 (2) J. OF
PEACE RES. 213 (2000).
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The experiences of Asian countries with democratization are largely consistent with the findings
of these multiple country studies. In Indonesia, there have been numerous human rights violations after
the fall of Suharto, most notably with respect to ethnic violence, the tragedy in East Timor, and the
violence that marred the 1999 elections.73 Similarly, Amnesty International reported in 1993 that the
human rights situation had not substantially improved under the democratic regime in South Korea.74
Even the former rights activist and President Kim Dae Jung was unwilling or unable to do away with the
strict National Security Law despite his campaign promises. To be sure, the number of persons arrested
for violating the National Security Law has decreased in recent years. Nevertheless, almost 80 people
were arrested in the first year of the presidency of former human rights lawyer Roh Moo-hyun. Moreover,
while the government is more hesitant to invoke national security concerns to justify rights violations, in
practice law enforcement agencies continue to emphasize confession and make use of "special
interrogation rooms" maintained in the prosecutors' office.75 Although Cambodia held elections in 1993
and 1998, the period was marked by battles between government armed forces and the Khmer Rouge,
resulting in continued human rights violations including murder, rape, hostage-taking, and secret
detention.76 The government offered an amnesty to key leaders and supporters of the Khmer Rouge, much
to the dismay of many rights advocates. Nevertheless, stability remained an issue with a preemptive coup
by Hun Sen in 1997 in which more than fifty people were killed, many of them shot in the back of the
head after arrest.77 In the Philippines, democracy has not resolved pressing socioeconomic problems.
Under Ramos, the percentage living in poverty was reduced, but the gap between rich and poor grew.78
There have also been numerous rights violations, including disappearances, extrajudicial killings,
arbitrary arrests, and prolonged detention, as the government continues to struggle against insurgents.79
Consistent with popular views in other countries threatened by terrorism and insurgents, most Filipino
citizens apparently do not consider the government’s tough treatment of terrorists as human rights
violations. Preoccupied fighting terrorists, the government has been too weak to deal with corruption and
violence, and democracy has been driven by cronyism, family networks in the countryside, and
personalities.
Moreover, a large number of citizens in Taiwan and South Korea continue to harbor serious
doubts about democracy. Taiwan and South Korea have generally been considered success stories in that
they have achieved relatively mature democracies, although the violence and allegations of impropriety in
the recent presidential election in Taiwan have tarnished Taiwan’s image. With a 2.0 ranking on Freedom
House’s political rights and civil liberties scale, they are considered to be “liberal democracies,” despite
shortcomings in rule of law and restraints on executive power. Nevertheless, “support for democracy lags
well behind the levels detected in other emerging and established democracies. And on some dimensions
of belief, the two publics exhibit a residual preference for authoritarian or nondemocratic principles, akin
to the portrait of traditional or ‘Asian values.’”80 Global studies suggest that democracy becomes stable
when 70% of the populace insists on democracy as the best form of government.81 However, only slightly
more than half of citizens in South Korean and Taiwan believe that democracy is the best form of
73
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government, while 30% of Koreans and 12% of Taiwanese maintain that an authoritarian government is
sometimes preferable. Support for democracy has even declined in South Korea after the financial crisis
and the scandals in the presidency of Kim Young Sam presidency, including one involving his son.
Moreover, some 65% of Koreans claim economic development is more important than democracy, while
only 1 out of 7 choose democracy.82
Numerous polls throughout the region show similar majoritarian support for economic
development and social stability over democracy and civil and political rights. 83 This is perhaps not
surprising given that between 60% and 84% of Indonesians, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese and Chinese
identify economic difficulties as their number one concern, with 37% of Indonesians, 44% of Indians,
57% of Filipinos, 31% of Vietnamese and 18% of Chinese claiming difficulties in affording adequate
food.84 In other parts of the developing world, large majorities also are willing to trade off democracy for
economic growth. More than twice as many Latin Americans would choose development over
democracy, while 50% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they would not mind having a
non-democratic government if it could solve economic problems.85 Moreover, just as impoverished Latin
Americans have become disillusioned with the third wave of democracy and are dissatisfied with their
governments, between 75% and 92% of citizens are dissatisfied with the government in democratic Japan,
South Korea, India, Indonesia and the Philippines. In contrast, almost half of Chinese and almost 70% of
Vietnamese are satisfied with the government.86 Interestingly, Asian citizens are generally satisfied with
their own lives and optimistic about the future, with between half and three-quarters of respondents in
India, China, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and Bangladesh believing their lives
would improve in the next five years and less than 10% worried that their lives would not improve during
the same period.87 However, beliefs about future growth and improvement in personal circumstances do
not necessarily translate into satisfaction with the current government in democratic states. One can only
speculate about what the implications for democracy would be if people came to believe they would be
worse off in the future under a democratic regime.
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Even when many Asians prefer democracy, they may prefer majoritarian or nonliberal variants to
liberal democracy. Nearly two-thirds of Koreans agreed with the statement that “If we have political
leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything”, 40% believed that “the government
should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society,” while 47% believe that
“if people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.”88 In contrast to South
Koreans and Taiwanese, there is overwhelming support for democracy among Thais, with an astounding
90% satisfied with the way democracy works in Thailand and 85% maintaining that democracy is always
preferable to authoritarianism.89 Nevertheless, half of Thais still rank economic development as more
important than democracy, 90 suggesting popular support for the government’s current policies which
emphasize economic growth and majoritarian concerns even if at the expense of individual liberties in
some instances.91 Moreover, Thais remain distrustful of political parties, while 75% view diversity of
political and social views as threatening, and 45% are unwilling to tolerate minority viewpoints.92 Nor is
there a very deep commitment to rule of law and separation of powers. A majority would accept
government control over the judiciary or even parliament to promote the wellbeing of the nation.93
That some Asian citizens would harbor doubts about the most recent wave of democratization is
understandable given the disappointing results of earlier experiments with democracy in Asia and the
lackluster performance of many recently democratized states in other parts of the world that has led to a
reversion to authoritarianism in several. Indonesia tried democracy just after independence from the
Dutch between 1950 and 1957. The experiment ended when Sukarno declared martial law. Thailand has
gone through numerous cycles of democratic elections followed by military-led coups - since 1932, there
have been some seventeen coups attempts.94 South Korea held elections in the 1960s and early 1970s
before returning to authoritarian rule. The less-than-successful experiments with democracy in the
Philippines from 1935 led to the declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972. More generally, many
third-wave democracies have failed to generate economic growth or to deliver on human rights promises,
leading to massive discontent on the part of the citizenry, calls to cut back on liberal rights in favor of a
harsher law and order agenda, and in some cases reversion to authoritarian governments.95
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American see no alternative to democracy, many Asians see some form of soft authoritarianism or
nonliberal democracy as viable options.
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Although democracy may be messy everywhere, recent elections in Asia have been particularly
disheartening. The presidential elections in Indonesia featured two former military men, who collectively
received more than a majority of the vote in the preliminary run-off. One of them, General Wiranto, the
head of Suharto’s former Golkar Party, is accused of being a war criminal for attacks on civilians in East
Timor. Far from being disqualifying, the accusations seem to have caused some Indonesians to support
the General in a show of nationalist resistance to foreign pressure and criticism.96 In India, the voters
threw out a regime despite a growth rate of 8%, opting instead for the Congress Party, led by the Italian
born Sonia Ghandi, widow of the assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Ghandi - who then promptly
decided not to take office. The turmoil caused the single biggest one-day drop in the stock markets ever,
although the markets recovered when Ghandi named a renowned economist known for his marketorientation to head her party.97 The elections - marred by the deaths of over 20 women and children in a
stampede to secure sarees, boycotts of the polls in Kashmir by separatist militants and a bomb that killed
eleven people attending a political rally, the murder of 26 policemen by Maoist guerillas in Jharkhand, the
shooting deaths of three political party members in Bihar, and the usual charges of rampant vote-buying were described as relatively clean and successful by Indian standards.98 In the Philippines, where former
actor Joseph Estrada was impeached and forced out of office after being linked to illegal payoffs from
gambling lords, President Arroyo squared off against another leading film actor, Fernando Poe, a high
school drop out who had never held public office, although he did once play a town mayor in the movies.
Poe studiously avoided the issues in a campaign long on symbol and short on substance on the part of
both candidates.99 In Taiwan, Chen Shuibian seemed willing to risk confrontation with Beijing just to stay
in office, continually pushing Beijing and Washington with calls for a national referendum and
constitutional changes, despite stern warnings from Beijing and Washington to avoid further provocation.
Even close observers of Taiwanese politics - used to, as they are, fisticuffs and chair-throwing by
members of the legislature - were shocked by the dirty politics in which the KMT compared Chen to
Hitler and then the bizarre shooting of the president and vice-president by a slow-moving bullet on the
day before elections.100 Capitalizing on the sympathy vote from the shooting, Chen claimed victory by
less than 30,000 votes out of a total of 13.3 million. After weeks of protests and demonstrations both
peaceful and otherwise by supporters of the LDP, Chen was sworn into office, and must now lead a
deeply divided public. Meanwhile, in South Korea, President Roh was impeached on charges of illegal
campaigning, corruption among his aides and mismanagement of the economy, acquitted and reinstated.101
However, his subsequent attempt to replace several cabinet members without following constitutional
procedures gave rise to complaints of amateurism and unflattering comparisons to the heavy-handed ways
of former dictators.102
The experiences of Asian countries demonstrate that democracy is no panacea, and that
democratization will not necessarily lead to improvements in human rights, resolve ethnic tensions, or
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ensure economic growth and better standards of living. In some cases, there may be a tension between
democracy and the protection of rights and other goals. The problems with democracy in Asia do not
support the conclusion that authoritarian regimes would necessarily be preferable. They do suggest
however the possibility that democracy may not be the only or best option in all circumstances. Of
course, authoritarian regimes also have their problems, and not all have been successful in ensuring
economic growth or improving citizens’ lives. Thus much depends on the specific nature of the regime.
At minimum, the performance of both democratic and non-democratic regimes should be scrutinized and
evaluated objectively and without bias.103 Democracy proponents often argue in the face of poor economic
performance, massive demonstrations and calls for regime change, elections marred by violence and votebuying that democracy is “messy.”104 However, the same apologists for democracy are quick to criticize
every shortcoming under an authoritarian regime, to blame the problems on the nondemocratic nature of
the government and to call for immediate elections as a solution. One can only imagine the scorn that
would be heaped on anyone so bold as to offer in response to political violence, widespread corruption
and other social maladies in authoritarian states the limp excuse that “authoritarianism is messy.”
Culture and religion
As critics of Asian values have pointed out, the Asian region clearly boasts a wide diversity of religious
systems and cultural practices. The wide diversity prevents simplistic conclusions based on stereotypes
about Confucians or Muslims or Asian communitarians. Nevertheless, as the various surveys cited in this
Article show, values continue to affect the outcome across a wide range of rights issues.
Cultural factors would seem to explain in part the relatively greater restrictions on free speech
and the media in both democratic and nondemocratic states.105 The restrictions are most apparent in North
Korea and Myanmar, although Singapore, Malaysia, China and Vietnam are also known for tight limits
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on the press.106 But even the more democratic countries in the region keep a short leash on the press and
free speech by citizens. South Korean President Roh has declared that the government will take legal
action against any news organization that publishes editorials containing false information regarding
government policy or personnel. In 2003, Roh personally brought a libel suit against four major
newspapers who allegedly defamed him and his family by publishing falsehoods about his fund-raising
activities and real estate transactions. 107 In Indonesia, after a period of expansive freedom of speech and
the press during the Habibe and Wahid years, the Megawati government, supported by a public
increasingly wary of unfettered expression, pushed through a law that imposed several restrictions on
freedom of expression, assembly and the press. The former editor of a daily paper was found guilty of
insulting the chairman of Golkar party currently serving as speaker of legislature, while another editor
was prosecuted for insulting Megawati.108 Meanwhile, in Thailand, television and radio stations remain
publicly owned, and the government has used the leverage gained from licensing and advertisements to
influence press coverage, resulting in self-censorhip and the sacking of editors critical of the
government.109 Freedom House therefore demoted Thailand from “free” to “partly free” status.110 Despite
a liberal press, India continues to prosecute people who criticize the judiciary, while libel cases remain
common. 111 Even in Japan, a broad ban on incitement of illegal activities, permit requirements for
demonstrations and other restrictions allow the government considerable room to restrict free speech in
the name of public order.112
Religion also remains a crucial and oftentimes divisive factor in several states, leading to broad
state powers to restrict religious practice in the name of social order and harmony. Governments in the
region are extremely wary of the volatile mix of religion and politics. At one extreme, Islamic
fundamentalism has fueled insurgency and separatist movements in Thailand, Indonesia and China, and
raised concerns in multi-ethnic Malaysia and Singapore.113 China is also wary of Tibetan Buddhists’
support for the Dalai Lama. Religious groups have also fought with each other, resulting in bloody
conflicts in India, Indonesia and elsewhere. Countermeasures in these countries have ranged from violent
repression and the imposition of martial law along with derogation of rights, to registration requirements
for religious organizations, limits on venues of worship, restrictions on or prohibitions of religious
education, limitations on hate speech or other speech that could incite religious conflicts, and banning of
the wearing of religious symbols such as veils or headscarves in public.114 In China, members of the five
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official churches are allowed to practice without undue restrictions. However, members of unapproved
house churches who have sought to unite with the Pope and advocated religious-based practices that are
at odds with the government policies on contraception and abortion have been harassed and prosecuted.115
With a regulatory regime much like China’s, Vietnam tolerates and even encourages religious practice
provided the religion does not become a source of opposition to government policies or undermine efforts
to establish the “Great Unity” of Vietnamese society.116 In Singapore, religious leaders who challenge
state policies or become involved in political issues have run afoul of government policies that try to
confine religious groups to educational, social and charitable work, rather than “radical social action.”117
Drawing a balance between freedom of religion and political stability has been proven especially
difficult with respect to new religions or cults. Aware that religious groups have destabilized dynasties in
the past, China imposes content-based restrictions on “cults” and “abnormal” religious beliefs and
practices.118 The crackdown on Falungong has received the most attention abroad, although the group
considers itself a breathing exercise group rather than a religion. The government has justified the ban by
citing the sect’s increasingly political agenda, organized demonstrations including where more than
10,000 people suddenly surrounded Zhongnanhai (the seat of the government), and the deaths of more
than 1600 adherents, including the self-immolation of five people, one of them a 12-year old girl.119 The
government has also outlawed a number of other sects, claiming they lack theological training, preach the
coming of the Apocalypse or Holy War, exploit members for financial gain or commit other violations of
generally applicable laws such as rape, assault, and tax fraud. Beijing defends the policies by citing
similar restrictions on cults in other countries, including France and Belgium.120 In the Asian region,
Japan’s Supreme Court upheld the ban on Aum Shinrikyo after its leaders were arrested for releasing
poisonous gas in the subway in Tokyo.121 Singapore has also banned Jehovah Witnesses for refusing to
serve in the military. 122 South Korea, faced with a similar problem, refused to recognize Jehovah
Witnesses as conscientious objectors.123
Unfortunately, international law provides little useful guidance in distinguishing normal from
abnormal religious activities and legitimate groups from cults. 124 More generally, the potential for
religious authority to challenge and undermine state authority has led to a wavering and incoherent
doctrine both internationally and domestically in many countries with respect to such issues as separation
of church and state and reasonable restrictions on religious practice.125 Within Asia alone, freedom of
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religion exists side by side with state-endorsed atheism in China and Vietnam, and Islam as the official
state religion in Malaysia. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Catholicism is privileged in numerous ways,
including constitutional provisions on abortion and divorce that reflect Catholic religious principles;126 in
Japan, Shinto remains favored, with courts reluctant to hold visits by state leaders to Shinto shrines to be
a violation of the principle of separation of state and church;127 and in Thailand, Buddhism is so dominant
as to constitute implicitly the official religion.128
Legal institutions
Empirical studies have only begun to explore the relationship between legal institutions and protection of
different types of rights. 129 While promising, this approach is likely to produce indeterminate and
inconsistent results because of the wide variation among countries on key legal institutions and practices
such as separation of powers, constitutional review, judicial review of executive power, judicial
independence, the way judges are appointed, and so on. Asian legal systems are no exception, differing
widely in institutions, practices and conceptions of rule of law. 130 Moreover, legal institutions that
function well in one context may produce very different outcomes in other contexts.
What does seem clear from the broad empirical studies as well as the experiences of Asian
countries to date is that judicial independence is generally important if not sufficient for the protection of
rights, particularly civil and political rights. The regimes with the least independent courts have some of
the worst records in protecting civil and political rights, including China, Vietnam, Myanmar and North
Korea. On the whole, democratization has resulted in increased independence of the courts and a more
active role in protecting rights, most notably in South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia.
However, judicial independence alone does not ensure that the courts will play an active role in
protecting rights. The level of judicial activism varies tremendously in the region. At one extreme,
despite a conception of fundamental rights as inherent or the natural rights of all human beings and
explicit constitutional references to such open-ended notions as unenumerated rights and human dignity,
Japanese courts have exercised their powers of judicial review sparingly in the service of rights,
interpreting public welfare limitations on rights broadly and generally deferring to the legislature. 131
Courts in Singapore and Malaysia also continue to interpret rights narrowly, relying on a positivist rather
than a purposive or natural law based method of interpretation. At the other extreme are the Indian,
Taiwanese, and Filipino courts. The India Supreme Court and the Grand Justices of Taiwan have gone so
far as to strike down constitutional amendments as unconstitutional.132 In the Philippines, the court has
aggressively engaged in social and economic policymaking by interpreting “directive principles” in the
constitution. To be sure, activist does not necessarily mean liberal. In Thailand, the courts have shown a
126
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conservative inclination to side with entrenched interest groups.133 Similarly, although Indian courts have
come to the aid of the disenfranchised in a variety of ways, the courts remain organs of the state and
judges are inclined by personal circumstances and professional training toward moderate rather than
radical solutions.134
The aggressiveness of the courts also varies by category of right. National laws frequently
prohibit or limit judicial review of many national security decisions. But even when judicial review is
possible, Asian courts have been reluctant to challenge executive and parliamentary decisions involving
national security.135
Similarly, the role of courts is limited in China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Hong
Kong and South Korea with respect to many social and economic rights by the traditional view that such
rights are generally not justiciable or that they involve resource allocation decisions best left to the
legislature. Nevertheless, even where such rights are considered nonjusticiable, Asian governments
generally have taken seriously their obligations to provide the necessary minimal conditions for human
flourishing, subject to resource constraints largely in line with GDP levels, as the empirical studies
indicate. The conceptualization however is not so much in terms of rights as traditional paternalistic
beliefs that rulers are obligated to ensure the material and spiritual wellbeing of the people. For instance,
in China, the new leadership of Hu and Wen has shown sensitivity to issues of social justice,
implementing a number of policies to ease the hardships those who have lost out in the transition to a
more competitive capitalist economic system. In so doing, they are able to draw on a rich tradition of
“people as the basis” stretching back to Mencius. While such traditions are grounded in a nonliberal
paternalistic worldview, they nonetheless provide a normative basis for social, economic, cultural and
collective rights claims today.136
On the other hand, several Asian countries have developed an active jurisprudence of economic
and social rights, in keeping with a redistributive, developmental model of rule of law that emphasizes
redistribution of wealth and social justice issues domestically, and the right of development, debt
forgiveness and the obligation of the North/developed countries to aid the South/developing countries
internationally.137 The Indonesian constitution contains a long list of social and economic rights, while
Indian and Filipino courts have blurred or overcome the distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable right through interpretation of constitutional references to programmatic goals and directive
133
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principles. The involvement of the judiciary in these complex social and economic policy issues has
naturally been controversial, and challenged both in terms of the merits of the decisions and in terms of
judicial competence and the proper role for the courts.138 A particularly pressing issue is whether wellintentioned reformers who push for the incorporation of such a broad array of positive rights in the
constitutions of countries at relatively low levels of economic development are not setting the government
up for failure by promising citizens more than the government can possibly deliver. In India, the
Bharatiya Janata Party government was voted out of office despite overseeing a period of rapid economic
growth. The vote reflected a deep dissatisfaction with growing income disparities and widespread poverty
amidst the growing wealth of some segments of society. The BJP’s campaign slogan of India Shining
only highlighted the discrepancies between the haves and the have-nots. By way of comparison, in
wealthy South Korea, which has not made social rights justiciable, the government only this year made
good on its promise to provide an equal education for all by providing nine-years of compulsory
education free of charge.139
Indonesia offers another cautionary tale. After the fall of Suharto, reformers, flush with optimism,
wrote into the Indonesian constitution some of the most forward-leaning ideas of the human rights
movement. Accordingly, the constitution now provides that each person has the right to physical and
spiritual welfare, to have a home, to enjoy a good and healthy living environment and to obtain health
services. 140 Reflecting the “capabilities” approach, each person is entitled to assistance and special
treatment to gain the same opportunities and benefits in the attainment of equality and justice.141 Needless
to say, the Megawatti government in low-income Indonesia has not been able to live up to such broad
commitments or even to effectively deal with terrorism and rising crime rates, which may explain in part
the support for former General Wiranto. Supporters believed that Wiranto would restore law and order
and social stability while ensuring economic growth, although rights activists feared that he would fall
back on the strong-arm governing methods of Suharto to do so. Realizing that writing rights into the
constitution does not ensure the resources necessary for their implementation, the general populace seems
to have become wary of the utopian promises of human rights NGOs on the one hand, and their constant
criticisms of the government obviously lacking the means to deliver on such promises on the other.142
Thailand may be experiencing a similar dynamic. Now that Thailand has democratized, the
government is struggling to improve the standards of living for citizens. The ruling party has acted in
many ways like a traditional Asian government, with a strong executive pushing through policies aimed
at ensuring economic development and a better standard of living for the majority. As a result, the
economy has recovered, and the deterioration in quality of life as measured by the UNDP HDI index has
reversed. Yet NGOs and rights activists remain critical of government policies, pointing out how,
notwithstanding considerable progress, problems remain with respect to disadvantaged hilltribe peoples
and socially vulnerable individuals, and how economic development has come at the expense of
138
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transparency and political participation.143 To be sure, the Thailand constitution has incorporated broad
ideals such as “human dignity,” and NGO critics raise legitimate concerns. But governments in middle
income countries such as Thailand will inevitably have difficulty living up to such idealistic standards.
The broad public seems more tolerant and supportive of the government efforts to address issues within
the limits of available resources.
Although judicial independence is generally important to the protection of rights, relying on
courts alone is clearly not sufficient to protect rights adequately. Courts are limited by political
constraints, restrictive laws, interpretive traditions and their inability to control financial decisions and
implement their own decisions. A variety of other institutions have arisen to assist courts in protecting
rights, including national human rights commissions, ombudsmen and a vast network of NGOs.
Several states have established national human rights commissions, including Thailand,
Indonesia, India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. On the whole, the commissions have mixed records.
Many rights advocates were skeptical about Malaysia’s human rights commission Sukaham, fearing that
it would end up serving as a mouthpiece for the government. Sukaham’s inclusion in the foreign
ministry, headed by a foreign minister who objected to the liberal biases of the human rights movement
and argued that Malaysia should not be judged based on international conventions, suggested that main
purpose was to better defend the government against foreign criticism.144 However, the commission has
interpreted its mandate broadly to include social and economic rights, pushed for ratification of
international treaties and issued reports critical of the government, including calling for the amendment or
repeal of the Internal Security Act. At the same time, Sukuham has been reluctant to take sides in
Malaysia’s complicated cultural and racial issues. This selective approach may in part reflect the
indeterminacy of international human rights laws in these areas, and the problems of applying abstract
and general principles to complex local contexts. Sukuham may also have been acting strategically,
however, trying to gain a foothold and build up a certain amount of popular support and legitimacy in an
environment where government support remains equivocal, by avoiding issues that are deeply divisive
within Malaysian society and likely to upset the majority whose support is crucial for the commission’s
survival.
In Indonesia, the human rights commission enjoyed popular support during the Suharto era, when
the majority was united in opposition to Suharto. However, the commission has been taken less seriously
after democratization both by the government and the public.145 As in many countries, the commission
tends to be forward-leaning, dominated by NGOs pushing the most liberal interpretation of international
rights law and the latest UN agenda. As such, the commission has not backed away from criticizing postSuharto governments for their shortcomings. However, the governments, whether of Habibe, Wahid, or
Megawati, have had their hands full dealing with terrorism, rising Islamic fundamentalism, unrest in Aceh
and the usual developmental problems faced by a low income country. Naturally, they have not
welcomed the commission’s constant reminder of every shortcoming and lapse from the idealistic
standard of the international covenants.146 As noted, the public seems to have grown weary of the constant
carping and unrealistic expectations of human rights activists. The more liberal positions of the
commission may also be at odds with the attitudes of the general public.
Human rights commissions have experienced conflicts with the courts as well as the executive
branch and the public. In the Philippines, the Supreme Court ruled in a series of cases that the
commission had no power to provide remedies, but was limited to conducting investigations and issuing
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reports. Apart from concerns about inconsistency, the court seemed eager to defend its turf and its role in
the post-authoritarian polity as the main defender of rights and protector of the people. In Indonesia, the
human rights commission has been limited in effectiveness because of the lack of coordination among the
various institutions with some role in protecting rights.147
Regional rights systems have played an instrumental role in facilitating the development of rights
norms, jurisprudence and implementation, especially in Europe. Unlike the Americas, Europe and Africa,
Asia lacks a regional rights system. One possible explanation is that there is a greater diversity of values,
political systems and conceptions of rights in Asia. However, a more likely explanation is that Asian
governments have been reluctant to establish a regional rights body out of traditional sovereignty
concerns that it is not appropriate for other countries or a regional body to intervene in how other
countries handle human rights issues except in circumstances where there are widespread and systematic
violations of rights. In addition, Asian governments have on the whole emphasized economic
development and political stability. However, the need for a regional entity to promote economic
development and geopolitical stability is already filled by the increasingly robust ASEAN.
Population size and ethnic diversity
Larger populations are associated with more rights violations in absolute terms and per capita, because
there is likely to be greater conflict among different interest or ethnic groups and/or the government is
more willing to resort to force to curtail potential threats to social order given the larger number of people
that would be affected by social chaos. Populations run the gamut from China at 1.3 billion to Singapore
at 4.1 million. The populations of the other countries are: India 1.03 billion, United States 288 million,
Indonesia 214 million, Japan 127 million, Vietnam 79 million, Philippines 77 million, Thailand 66
million, France 59 million, South Korea 47 million, Malaysia 23 million, and Hong Kong 7 million.
Population does help explain rights performance in some cases, particularly for China and India.
First, their huge population are directly tied to quality of life issues as reflected in social and economic
measures because limited resources are spread thin over large numbers. Second, as elsewhere, population
size is also a proxy for ethnic diversity. Ethnic diversity has led to conflicts with the state as some groups
push for greater independence in both countries. It has also led to conflicts among ethnic groups seeking
a larger share of resources and demanding affirmative action, preferential tax benefits, and exemptions
generally applicable laws and regulations.148 The response in China to such conflicts has included both
carrots and sticks. Carrots include the establishment of special autonomous zones, affirmative actions
policies and the allocation of additional resources to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty in
ethnic areas. Sticks include restrictions on the civil and political rights in the name of national security,
public order and social harmony. Third, the sheer size of the population results in a “large” number of
violations of physical integrity rights and civil and political rights, even though proportionally the number
is small. China and India’s low level-4 rating on the Political Terror Scale reflects in large part the
relatively high absolute number of personal integrity rights violations rather than the low per capita
figures. Fourth, and more substantively, the size of the population makes control more difficult, instability
more likely and the expected danger value calculated by the multiplying the likelihood of instability by
the consequences of chaos higher. In a country the size of China or India, even the most radical antigovernment movements and bizarre cults may attract a significant number of followers, especially now
that internet has eliminated the barrier of communication across distance.
The degree of ethnic diversity is arguably as important as the mere size of the population.149 The
ethnic diversity of several Asian countries has affected human rights protection both directly, through a
147
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Scott Walker & Steven Poe, Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries’ Respect for Human Rights, 24
(1) Hum. Rts. Q. 237 (2002) (finding that realization of rights is more difficult in ethnic diverse
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variety of complicated schemes that balance affirmative action and non-discrimination, and indirectly, by
adding to civil tensions that have resulted in harsh crackdowns and limitations on civil and political
liberties. Indian’s constitutional history and the broad powers granted to the government to order
preventive detention cannot be understood without reference to India’s struggle for independence from
Britain, the legacy of ethnic-based tensions resulting from the attempt to divide the territory into Hindu
India and Muslim Pakistan, and the continuing pressure of ethnic and religious based secessionist
movements and tensions that often erupt into violent clashes.150 Ethnic diversity has also been invoked to
support broad state powers and tough national security laws in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and China,
while an upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism has led to martial law in parts of Indonesia and Thailand.
Asian countries have adopted a variety of approaches to cultural rights in response to ethnic and
religious diversity from a melting pot approach that emphasizes assimilation, to a “salad bowl” approach
that seeks to celebrate different traditions and cultures, to a pragmatic approach that steers a middle
course and emphasizes social stability and harmony.151 Some states, including Malaysia and India, have
adopted a group rights approach, whereas others such as Singapore seek to protect groups by protecting
the rights of the individuals that make up the group.
India has opted for the salad bowl approach. The Indian Constitution provides strong protections
for religious and cultural minorities. Problems arise however when religious and cultural practices are at
odds with international rights. For example, Muslin personal law may disadvantage women, while
traditional Hindu beliefs discriminate against untouchables. In response, the government has adopted a
complicated two-track system that emphasizes reform to certain Hindu practices system while leaving
other ethnic and religious issues to be sorted out over time.
Malaysia has adopted a group based approach that recognizes Islam as the state religion and
affords special privileges to the dominant but historically economically weak Malay population, including
electoral laws that ensure Malay control, designation of Malay as the national language, prominent
displays of Malayan culture in official ceremonies and on television programs, and economic policies
aimed at improving the lot of Malays. Naturally, the large Chinese minority has resented such affirmative
action policies. After the race riots in 1969, the government passed an emergency security law that
provided police wide powers of preventive detention. The government has also passed laws to prohibit
speech or actions that would promote feelings of ill-will, enmity, hatred, disharmony or disunity, or which
question the special position of Malays.152
In keeping with the rejection of group rights in favor of an individual rights approach, Singapore
rejects affirmative action based on group membership. The government also seeks to instill a national
identity without trying to eradicate more particularistic cultural identities, which it does not believe
possible. Notwithstanding its commitment to meritocracy, the government recognizes the need to protect
racial and religious minorities. Accordingly, it has recognized the distinctive cultural and economic
needs of indigenous Malays, most of whom are Muslim.153
level of civil rights, and that more diversity leads to worse performance with respect to political
rights, subsistence rights, civil rights and the social and economic equality of women, though the
relationships are statistically significant only for civil rights and social and economic equality for
women).
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Religious education is a divisive issue in several states due to the potential use of religious
education to foster demands for political autonomy and independence, greater political representation or a
greater share of resources. Accordingly, some states, including Vietnam, China, India and Thailand
impose various restrictions on religious education. Singapore allows religious education but requires that
students be able to meet generally applicable standards in certain basic subjects.
Bilingual education is another sensitive issue in Asia as elsewhere. While the right to be
educated in one’s mother tongue may be central to one’s cultural identity, failure to speak the language of
the majority may also limit one’s opportunities for development.
Colonial history
Every country in the region except Thailand has experienced colonialism, often by several different
powers, sometimes at the same time. Although the results of studies are somewhat inconsistent, on the
whole they tend to show that a history of British colonialism is associated with better human rights
protection, whereas Japanese colonialism and French colonialism may be associated with worse human
rights records. 154 It is however impossible to draw any hard and fast conclusions from the colonial
experiences of countries in Asia. In some cases, British colonialism has been instrumental in laying the
foundations for a rule of law compliant legal system. However, British rule was hardly democratic or
liberal, and citizens of countries ruled by the British did not enjoy full civil and political liberties. Indeed,
many illiberal state security laws were first put in place by the British, as in the case of Malaysia’s
Internal Security Act and Hong Kong’s laws on sedition. Colonial divide-and-rule strategies have also
exacerbated ethnic tensions and fueled secessionist movements as colonial powers swapped lands and
redrew boundaries with little regard for the identity needs of particular groups.
What is clear is that the colonial experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Asian
citizens, and made them disinclined to welcome what they take to be the hypocritical, self-righteous
preaching of former Western oppressors who regularly violated the civil and political rights of Asians
when it was in their political and economic interest to do so. In the eyes of many Asians, the current
human rights policies of Western powers and the international human rights regime are just one more
example of power politics, the latest variant in a long history of imperialism and hegemony in which the
West seeks to impose its way of life on the Rest.155
Although Singapore and Malaysia were most vocal in their criticism of the liberal biases and
hypocrisies of the western-dominated human rights movement, hostility and suspicion run much deeper
throughout the region. China has long argued, with some truth, that it is subject to a double standard.156
There is also a strong current of nationalism in China that has fed popular discontent with the way China
is portrayed in the media on rights issues. A broader current of nationalism is rising in various countries
in the region. In Thailand, anger at the IMF and its role in the Asian financial crisis has fanned a general
distrust of international institutions, including the U.N., as captured in the slogan “the U.N. is not my
father.”157 As noted, both in Thailand and Indonesia, public support for international rights NGOs and
154
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domestic rights commissions has weakened. In South Korea, rising nationalism is manifest in a tendency
to emphasize the "uniqueness" of Korea and Korean people; in the growing assertion of sovereignty and
independence in foreign relations, particularly with the U.S.; and in opposition to the economic offshoots
of globalization such as free-trade agreements, the opening of the service sector in education and law, and
policies to foster increased labor market flexibility. Ironically, all of these demands for more nationalistic
policy may be articulated in terms of human rights. 158 Independence in foreign policy is the natural
extension of a national right to self-determination; opposition to trade liberalization is supported by the
need to protect the subsistence rights of local farmers and manufacturers; and the adoption of global
standards in terms of labor policy arguably must be opposed to safeguard the rights of Korean workers.
Cloaking local concerns in the diverse language of human rights provides local activists some leverage in
their struggles with international NGOs. International NGOs, which are highly critical of North Korea,
have also clashed with domestic rights groups who favor reconciliation with North Korea.
Local opposition to universal human rights is not limited to Asia. Western countries as well
have struggled over how best to reconcile a commitment to universal principles with the complex reality
of local contingencies. However, at least for economically advanced Western liberal democracies, the
norms reflected in the international human rights corpus are largely consistent with, and indeed the
outgrowth of, their own values and experiences. As politically stable consolidated democracies, they do
not face the same pressures as many Asian states that are still struggling to consolidate democracy or to
ensure political stability in the face of separatist movements and other threats. As wealthy countries, they
also have the resources to establish institutions capable of implementing rule of law, and, were they so
inclined, to make good on the promises of social and economic rights. The “Asian values” movement in
part was an attempt for geopolitically weaker Asian states to forge a common basis so that Asian
countries could demand the same kind of margin of appreciation on human rights issues as extended to
Western countries. 159 At the heart of the argument was the claim that the interpretation and
implementation of rights does and should depend to some degree on local circumstances, including not
just values, but levels of economic development; political institutions and beliefs; legal institutions,
doctrines and practices; ethnic diversity; the presence of terrorists and other such factors.
Conclusion
Asian countries vary widely in their rights performances generally, on specific rights issues, and in the
factors that influence the protection of rights and the outcomes of specific cases. The level of economic
development is clearly a, and usually the most, significant factor. While money may not be able to buy
happiness, it does seem to buy a longer life, better education, more health care, and even civil and
political rights. The nature of the political regime is also important, but economics comes first, especially
at low levels. Given the importance of wealth to rights performance, comparisons are best made between
countries in the same income categories.
What then does this overview tell us about values in Asia? Asia is obviously a big place, with
tremendous diversity that makes it impossible to identify a singular set of “Asian values” shared by
everyone in Asia. On the other hand, a pluralism of Asian values is still Asian values. There is nothing
inherently contradictory in noting a diversity of values and still claiming that they are Asian. Nor need
each country within Asia share every single feature. There may still be dominant patterns within Asia.
The “West” and “liberalism” also encompass a tremendous diversity of views. Nevertheless, there are still
dominant trends in Western thought. “Liberalism” clearly has a stronger hold than “communitarianism”
in the West, for example, whereas the opposite seems to be true in much of Asia, although perhaps
collectivism is a more apt description than communitarianism.
158
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Asian values are by definition the dominant values that exist in Asia. They form a value cluster
with hierarchies and intensities that allow them to be compared to other value clusters. The individual
values that make up the cluster do not have to be unique to Asia, provided the cluster of values as a
whole, including the relative ranking and weighting of values within the cluster, is distinguishable from
the value clusters of other regions. Nor do Asian values have to be shared by all people within Asia or to
exist to the same degree or intensity or be ranked in the same order in all Asian countries, provided
however that if there are no statistically significant shared values between a country and the region at
large then the country should be identified as an outlier. There is obvious variation within
countries/cultures, so some people will have values that are in the minority in their own society but
perhaps dominant in others. Nor does it matter that the current distribution of values is due more to
factors such as economic growth or demographic factors like higher rural-urban ratios rather than
“cultural” explanations such as philosophical traditions or religious beliefs. Nor is it the case that the
current distribution will forever remain the same. For the moment, however, the distribution is what it is,
whatever the various causes.
Whether focusing on regions, countries, subnational units or individuals is useful depends on
one’s project. Any comparative project must begin by constructing categories that highlight certain
features and thus simplify to some extent quotidian reality. The problem has not been that the East and
West, Asian values and Western values are constructs, but that they have been overly simple constructs
that lacked a firm empirical foundation. On the other hand, the shortcoming of the many multiple country
studies that find greater “collectivism” and acceptance of hierarchy in Asia is not that they fail to identify
real differences along the individualism versus collectivism or hierarchy versus egalitarianism
continuums. Rather, the problem is that individualism versus collectivism, and hierarchy versus
egalitarianism, are often underdetermining in predicting the outcomes on many specific issues.
Accordingly, the broad studies are less useful in demonstrating the affects of such differences on a range
of specific issues and in sorting out the interplay of cultural factors and other factors in explaining
differences in outcomes. For that, we need more detailed studies.160
This empirical overview suggests that there are some general patterns on a range of specific
issues, and that values are one of the important factors in determining the outcomes, although not the
most determinative overall. One can see a family of resemblances across a range of issues: in the higher
priority assigned to social stability and economic development over civil and political rights; in the
greater willingness to accept limits on free speech; in the emphasis on education and the use of education
to promote national goals;161 in the superior performance on good governance measures relative to other
countries at similar income levels; in the relatively successful efforts to maintain social order and fight
crime; in the opposition to Western colonialism and emergence of a strong nationalist discourse or the
attempts to interpret human rights principles in terms of local values and circumstances. To be sure,
there clearly has been and will continue to be change within the region largely due to greater wealth,
urbanization and modernization. Nevertheless, core values continue to persist, and Asian countries and
the Asian region as a whole continue to exhibit relative differences with other countries and regions on
160

An excellent example of one such study is AUSTRALIA IN ASIA: COMPARING CULTURES (Anthony
Milner & Mary Quilty eds., 1996). Focusing on a variety of practical issues, the various chapters
repeatedly demonstrate four points. First, there is significant diversity within Asia. Second, the
contrast between liberal emphasis on the individual and the emphasis on the collective cuts across
many issues from business ethics to human rights, conceptions of democracy, labor relations, national
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to significant and persisting divergence.
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dimensions such as individualism versus collectivism and hierarchy versus egalitarianism even
controlling for wealth. Accordingly, we are likely to see signs of convergence and divergence on human
rights issues in the future, both interregionally and intraregionally.
The Asian values debate has often been carried on at an excessively abstract level by advocates of
universal human rights and those who question just how universal rights are. The former have argued
that there is an expansive over-lapping consensus regarding human rights as demonstrated by ratification
of rights covenants. In response, critics argue that the hard core of universal rights is extremely limited,
and that ratification of rights covenants does not demonstrate a thick consensus on specific issues.
Although there are many rights that people agree are desirable when stated at very high level of
abstraction, agreement at such a lofty level is not helpful in resolving most pressing social issues. The
broad empirical studies are too general to shed much light on these debates. More detailed studies of
particular cases are necessary to determine the degree of commonality and diversity.
Analysis of particular cases in various Asian countries demonstrates that there are differences
both in terms of black letter law and outcomes in similar cases, oftentimes even when the laws are
similar.162 For instance, all countries advocate freedom of religion. Yet Malaysia and Singapore, two
ethnically diverse states often linked together as advocates of Asian values, differ significantly in their
approach to religious freedom and minority rights. Although they face similar problems and share a
common concern for social stability and religious harmony, Malaysia and Singapore have reached
different outcomes on similar cases. Similarly, defamation laws vary widely within Asia, despite a
general commitment to freedom of speech. While wealth explains much of the variation within Asia and
elsewhere, the outcomes in specific cases are often driven by complex patterns of generally applicable
and locally specific variables. Broad similarities in doctrine and principles are juxtaposed with subtle
differences in local circumstances that shape outcomes in particular cases and bring to the forefront
certain issues rather than others within a particular category of rights. As a result, what may seem like a
pragmatic or overlapping consensus quickly breaks down once one moves beyond discussions about the
desirability of the broad wish list of rights contained in human rights documents to the difficult issues of
the justifications for such rights and how they are interpreted and implemented in actual cases in practice.
Whether one focuses on regional, country or subnational studies, the results are worrisome for
advocates of universal human rights. Supporters of universal human rights have sought to discredit the
notion of Asian values by pointing to the tremendous diversity within the region. However, if such
diversity precludes the possibility of common values within the Asian region, then it also precludes a
fortiori the possibility of universal values.163 Alternatively, one could claim that there are common values
within the Asian region but they are not distinctive. However, what common values do exist are so
abstract and so “thin” that they lead to widely divergent outcomes on specific issues, many of which are
not consistent with current human standards as interpreted by the ICCPR human rights committee and
liberal rights activists. Both the regional studies and more specific country studies cited herein suggest
that the secular liberalism that provides the thicker ideological basis for the human rights movement today
is not widely accepted within Asian countries.
Drawing sufficiently detailed policy implications from this study is complicated. Economic
growth, rule of law, social and political stability, and - at least at moderate to high income levels democracy, are generally desirable and associated with better rights performance, all else being equal.
162
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Because “Asian values” has been tainted from misuse by politically oppressive regimes, one common
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Nevertheless, none of them individually nor all of them collectively guarantee realization of all types of
rights across the board. Clearly what works in one context may not work in another. Given the wide
variation in legal institutions and other factors that influence rights performance, the international human
rights community should be wary of one-size-fits-all solutions. In light of the diversity of values within
Asia and in comparison to other countries and regions, Asian countries should enjoy a “margin of
appreciation” like that provided European countries by the European Court of Human Rights.
Acknowledging the diversity on moral issues within Europe, the ECHR has tolerated differences in
outcomes particularly in cases involving national security, sex, sexual orientation and religion.
The results of this study suggest that a wide margin of appreciation should be extended to three
other areas. The first is free speech, specifically speech that incites hatred or exacerbates ethnic tensions.
Defamation and criticism of the government is another area where legal standards and practice vary.
However, the abuse of defamation laws to harass political opponents militates against broad deference to
governments in this area. Secondly, given the indeterminacy of international law and the vastly different
circumstances of particular countries in terms of ethnic and religious diversity, countries should be
allowed a wide margin of appreciation in deciding how best to ensure cultural rights, including issues of
freedom of religion such as what constitutes abnormal and normal practices or legitimate groups as
opposed to cults. Thirdly, given the disparities in the levels of wealth and the potentially destabilizing
effect of promising more than the government can deliver, states should be allowed considerable
discretion in the area of social and economic rights. Finally, there should be a general appreciation that
civil and political rights are a function of wealth, war and other circumstances, and that the majority of
citizens in different countries may very well decide to draw a different balance between the rights of
individuals and collective interests in this area. Recognition of such differences need not lead to an
express doctrine of deference to government decisions to limit rights in the name of public order, but
rather might lead to a more open-minded, careful scrutiny of the context-specific factors that allegedly
justify the restrictions in the particular case.
At minimum, every attempt should be made to involve groups with knowledge of the local
circumstances in identifying areas for change and in devising feasible plans for furthering the realization
of rights and the lofty goals contained in international rights documents. Perhaps most fundamentally,
more attention should be paid to economic development and poverty reduction because of the devastating
effects of poverty and the importance of economic development to the realization of all categories of
rights. However, acknowledging the importance and desirability of fostering economic development still
leaves unanswered the many practical issues about how best to achieve economic growth within a
particular country or region.
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Figure 1.1: Physical Integrity Rights 2002
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Source:
Gibney M., Political Terror Scale Scores. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/gibney_docs/pts.xls> (accessed 15 April 2004).
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Figure 2.1 Civil and Political Rights: Voice and Accountability, 2002
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World Bank (2003) Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002. Online. Available HTTP:
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002> (accessed 15 April 2004).
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Figure 3.1 Social Economic Rights: UNDP HDI Ranking, 2003
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Source:
United Nations Development Programme (2003) Human Development Indicators. Online. Available HTTP:
<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/index.html> (accessed 15 April 2004). LI refers to lower income
countries; LM to lower middle income; M to middle income; UM to upper middle income; HI to high income.
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Table 1.1: Poverty Index

Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

26
30
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43
28
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59
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Hong Kong (HI)
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Egypt (LM)
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Human poverty
index
(HPI-1)
Rank

Value
(%)

..
..
..
3
6
18
24
26
28
31
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39
44
47
49
53
59
90

..
..
..
4.1
6.3
11.4
12.9
14.2
14.8
16.4
17.9
19.9
24.3
30.5
31.7
33.1
36.2
52.0

Population below
income poverty line
HPI-1 rank minus
(%)
income poverty
National
rank
$1 a day $2 a day
poverty line
1990-2001 1990-2001
1987-2000
..
<2
<2
<2
..
9.9
<2
16.1
14.6
<2
7.2
17.7
82.3
3.1
<2
34.7
19.9
36.0

..
<2
9.3
8.7
..
23.7
32.5
47.3
46.4
7.3
55.4
63.7
94.5
43.9
14.5
79.9
59.7
64.2

..
..
..
17.0
..
..
13.1
4.6
36.8
..
27.1
..
47.9
16.7
..
28.6
41.6
34.9

..
..
..
1
..
-8
16
-13
-6
21
7
-4
-34
20
34
-9
6
14

Source:
HPI rank is determined on the basis of the HPI-1 values. The HPI value is a composite score based on standard of
living measurements including life expectancy (probability of death before age 40, education level (adult illiteracy
rate), access to water (population without sustainable access to water), and access to food (children under-weight for
age). The aggregation rule is specified in Technical Rule 1 of the UNDP 2003 report
Column 3-5: World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC.. The final
column is calculated on the basis of ranking data in columns 1 and PPP$1 data in column 3. A positive final column
figure indicates that the country performs better in income poverty than in human poverty, a negative the opposite.
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Table 2.1: Infant Mortality, Life Expectancy, and Primary School Enrollment
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Life expectancy at birth
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2001
Japan (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
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China (LM)
Romania (LM)
Iran (LM)
Philippines (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
Thailand (M)
Vietnam (LI)
Egypt (LM)
Brazil (UM)
Indonesia (LI)
India (LI)
South Africa (UM)
Tanzania (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)

81.3
79.7
78.7
77.8
76.9
75.8
75.6
75.2
73.6
72.8
70.6
70.5
69.8
69.5
69.1
68.9
68.6
68.3
67.8
66.2
63.3
50.9
44
35.4

Net Primary School Enrollment
Rate
(% eligible age children)
2001
Japan (HI)
France (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (UM)
Poland (UM)
Malaysia (M)
Brazil (UM)
United States (HI)
Vietnam (LI)
Singapore (HI)
Romania (LM)
Philippines (LM)
China (LM)
Egypt (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
Chile (UM)
South Africa (UM)
India (LI)
Thailand (M)
Nicaragua (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Iran (LM)
Tanzania (LI)

100
100
99
99
99
98
98
97
95
95
94
93
93
93
93
92
89
89
86
85
81
80
74
47

Source:
Column 1: UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 2003. The State of the World's Children 2003. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Column 2: UN (United Nations). 2003. World Population Prospects 1950-2050: The 2002 Revision. Database.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. New York.
Column 3: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).
2003. Correspondence on adult and youth literacy rates. January. Montreal.
Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau, available at
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm.
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Table 3.1: Public Spending Priorities (% GDP)

Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank
145
58
17
111
29
74
35
121
26
7
65
106
43
85
127
30
120
28
9
72
160
104
112
109

Zimbabwe (LI)
Malaysia (M)
France (HI)
South Africa (UM)
Taiwan (UM)
Thailand (M)
Poland (UM)
Nicaragua (LI)
Hong Kong
United States (HI)
Brazil (UM)
Iran (LM)
Chile (UM)
Philippines (LM)
India (LI)
South Korea (UM)
Egypt (LM)
Singapore (HI)
Japan (HI)
Romania (LM)
Tanzania (LI)
China (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
Vietnam (LI)

Public
Public Expenditure Expenditure on
on Education
Health

Military
Expenditure

1998-2000

2000

2000

10.4
6.2
5.8
5.5
5.5
5.4
5.0
5.0
4.9*
4.8
4.7
4.4
4.2
4.2
4.1
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.5
3.5
2.1
2.1
1.0
..

3.1
1.5
7.2
3.7
0.4
2.1
4.2
2.3
1.6
5.8
3.4
2.5
3.1
1.6
0.9
2.6
1.8
1.2
6.0
1.9
2.8
1.9
0.6
1.3

3.2
2.2
2.5
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.9
1.1
..
3.1
1.5
4.8
2.9
1.0
2.5
2.8
2.6
5.0
1.0
2.5
1.3
2.3
1.1
7.9

Source:
Column 1: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).
2003. Correspondence on education expenditure. February. Montreal. Hong Kong education figure from report to
ICESCR Committee.
Column 2: World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC.
Column 3: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2003. Correspondence on military expenditure
data. March. Stockholm.
Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau, available at
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm.
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Table 4.1: Income Inequality
Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

9
72
112
30
35
17
29
120
109
127
160
104
7
28
106
74
26
85
58
145
43
111
121

Japan (HI)
Romania (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
South Korea (UM)
Poland (UM)
France (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
Egypt (LM)
Vietnam (LI)
India (LI)
Tanzania (LI)
China (LM)
United States (HI)
Singapore (HI)
Iran (LM)
Thailand (M)
Hong Kong (HI)
Philippines (LM)
Malaysia (M)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Chile (UM)
South Africa (UM)
Nicaragua (LI)

Share of Income or
Consumption (%)
1990-2001
Poorest 20% Richest20%
10.6
8.2
8.4
7.9
7.8
7.2
6.7
8.6
8.0
8.1
6.8
5.9
5.2
5.0
5.1
6.1
5.3
5.4
4.4
4.6
3.2
2.0
2.3
2.2

35.7
38.4
43.3
37.5
39.7
40.2
41.1
43.6
44.5
46.1
45.5
46.6
46.4
49.0
49.9
50.0
50.7
52.3
54.3
55.7
61.3
66.5
63.6
64.1

Richest 20% to
Poorest 20%
1990-2001

Gini Index
(%)
1990-2001

3.4
4.7
5.2
4.7
5.1
5.6
6.2
5.1
5.6
5.7
6.7
8.0
9.0
9.7
9.7
8.3
9.7
9.7
12.4
12.0
19.3
33.6
27.9
29.7

24.9
30.3
30.3
31.6
31.6
32.7
34.5
34.4
36.1
37.8
38.2
40.3
40.8
42.5
43.0
43.2
43.4
46.1
49.2
56.8
57.5
59.3
60.3
60.7

Brazil (UM)
65
Source:
World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC; For Taiwan data see Report
on The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan Area, Republic of China, available at
http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/doc4/eng/conte91.htm. Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
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Voice and
Accountability

Political
Stability

Government
Effectiveness

Regulatory
Quality

Rule of Law

Control of
Corruption

Table 5.1: Regional Governance Indicators (2002 percentile rank)

OECD

91.3

87.2

91.6

91.9

91.6

91.3

Eastern Europe

65.0

60.5

57.7

63.2

56.5

54.7

Latin American and Caribbean

61.2

51.2

53.3

58.4

53.2

54.9

East Asia

50.3

54.6

50.5

42.8

47.5

44.4

Middle East and North Africa

28.6

40.1

49.9

44.9

54.2

54.7

South Asia

29.6

32.4

48.1

35.3

42.1

41.5

Subsaharan Africa

31.0

34.8

28.9

30.6

30.5

32.4

Former Soviet Union

22.7

31.1

21.7

25.4

20.4

16.8

Region and Human
Development Indicator Rank

Source: World Bank, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (2003), at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002.
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Voice and
Accountability

Political
Stability

Government
Effectiveness

Regulatory
Quality

Rule of Law

Control of
Corruption

Table 6.1: Quality of Governance (Percentile Rank, 2002)

Japan (HI)
France (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)

90.9
79.3
88.4
53.5

56.2
90.3
70.8
85.4

91.2
84.5
90.7
88.7

91.2
78.9
85.6
90.7

91.8
88.7
87.6
86.6

92.3
85.1
89.2
90.2

Singapore (HI)

65.7

91.9

100.0

99.5

93.3

99.5

29

Taiwan (UM)

74.2

70.3

82.5

80.9

80.9

77.3

30
35
43

South Korea (UM)
Poland (UM)
Chile (UM)

58
65

Malaysia (M)
Brazil (UM)

74
72
85

Thailand (M)
Romania (LM)

67.7
83.3
84.3
42.4
58.1
57.1
61.1
54.0

60.5
69.7
85.9
61.6
48.1
62.7
58.4
29.7

79.4
71.1
86.6
80.9
50.0
64.9
46.4
55.7

76.3
71.1
90.2
68.6
63.4
65.5
55.7
57.7

77.8
70.6
87.1
69.6
50.0
62.4
54.1
38.1

66.5
69.1
90.7
68.0
56.7
53.6
45.4
37.6

10.1
18.2
10.6
70.7
34.8

51.4
25.9
61.1
42.7
12.4

63.4
39.2
48.5
69.1
34.0

40.2
8.2
25.3
69.1
26.3

51.5
33.5
44.8
59.8
23.2

42.3
44.3
33.0
67.5
6.7

Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank
7

United States (HI)

9
17
26
28

Philippines (LM)

104 China (LM)
106 Iran (LM)
109 Vietnam (LI)
111 South Africa (UM)

112 Indonesia (LI)
60.6
22.2
54.1
43.8
57.2
49.5
127 India (LI)
22.2
34.1
46.9
38.1
57.7
47.9
120 Egypt (LM)
52.0
47.6
17.5
39.7
32.0
39.7
121 Nicaragua (LI)
7.1
8.6
22.2
4.1
5.7
6.2
145 Zimbabwe (LI)
37.9
35.7
36.1
33.5
38.7
15.5
160 Tanzania (LI)
Source: World Bank, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (2003), at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002.
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Table 7.1: Crime Statistics (rate per 100,000) 1997-2002
Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank Total Crime

7
9
17
26
28
29
30
35
43
58
65
72
74
85
104
106
109
111
112
120
121
127
145
160

United States (HI)
Japan (HI)
France (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
Singapore (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (UM)
Poland (UM)
Chile (UM)
Malaysia (M)
Brazil (UM)
Romania (LM)
Thailand (M)
Philippines (LM)
China (LM)
Iran (LM)
Vietnam (LI)
South Africa (UM)
Indonesia (LI)
Egypt (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
India (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Tanzania (LI)

4160.51
2300.77
6932.26
1085.64

Murder

Rape

Theft

Drug Offense

Incarceration

5.61
1.1
4.07
1.03

31.77
1.85
17.63
1.41

3804.58
1871.13
4224.57
623.16

539.92
21.68
182.19
36.77

701
54
93
184

703.84

0.8

2.81

415.5

85.08

388

2179.03

5.13

10.16

1473.03

111.13

250

1664.06
3634.84
1496.92
729.71
927.41
2207.05
245.53

2.18
3.15
4.54
2.1
22.98
7.44
8.07

4.29
6.09
9.97
5.78
8.5
8.34
6.17

386.31
1727.46
705.66
581.43
1028.33
90

8.97
93.65
16.68
78.95
46.29
2.04
438.13

125
211
204
161
160
199
401

-

7.85

4.21

10.21

14.53

94

133.82
83.56
8176.04
63.48
1372.27
671.2
6560.61
1647.98

2.16
1.08
114.84
0.8
24.03
3.93
10.15
7.95

121.13
0.73
26.03
1.6
38.38
10.05

87.75
31.41
3565.81
45.26
579.97
44.01
1958.11
194.11

3.92
11.26
111.85
3.77
22.79
2.25
57.03
13.39

184
226
71
402
38
121
143
29
160
120

Source:
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Column 1-5: Interpol, International Crime Statistics: Country Report, at http://www.interpol.int/Public/Statistics/ICS/; Column 6: International Center for Prison
Studies, School of Law at King's College of the University of London, World Prison Brief, at http://www.prisonstudies.org/. Some Taiwan, U.S. and Singapore
data came from compilations by national statistic offices. Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
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Table 8.1: Social Order. Divorce Rates, Suicide Rates, Young Mothers
Suicide Rates
Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

7
9
17
26
28
29
30
35
43
58
65
72
74
85
104
106
109
111
112
120
121
127
145
160

United States (HI)
Japan (HI)
France (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
Singapore (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (UM)
Poland (UM)
Chile (UM)
Malaysia (M)
Brazil (UM)
Romania (LM)
Thailand (M)
Philippines (LM)
China (LM)
Iran (LM)
Vietnam (LI)
South Africa (UM)
Indonesia (LI)
Egypt (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
India (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Tanzania (LI)

Divorce Rate
(per 1,000) (per 100,000)
1996-2000
1991-2002

Births by Mothers
Between Age 15-19
(per 1000 population
1995 to 2000)

4.19
1.98
1.98
1.95

10.85
25.3
17.75
13.25

9.14
0.70
1.58
1.08

1.20

9.45

1.07

-

13.59

0.50

2.52
1.09
0.42
0.60
1.40
-

13.55
15.4
5.8
4.2
12.35
4

0.63
4.12
10.19
4.06
19.05
7.93
12.41

-

2.1

11.80

0.81
0.83
1.17
-

13.9
0.2
0.05
3.45
10.65
7.9
-

0.97
13.86
6.52
21.34
15.10
14.36
45.06
12.52
31.34
39.37

Source:
Column 1: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 2000, 590 (2002); Column 2: World Health Organization,
Suicide Rates (Table), at http://www.who.lint/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en/; Column 3: United
Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database, at
http://esa.un.org/unpp/; Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
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Table 9.1: GDP with and without Purchase Price Parity Adjustment, 2001
GDP
(PPP US$
billions)

GDP per
Capita
(US$)

GDP per
Capita
(PPP US$)

10,065.3
4,141.4

9,792.5
3193.0

35,277
32,601

34,320
25,130

161.9
1,309.8
85.6

167.1
1,420.0
93.7

24,074
22,129
20,733

24,850
23,990
22,680

281.2

401.0

12,621

18,000

422.2
113.3
176.3
66.5
88.0
502.5
114.7
114.1
38.7
1,159.0

714.2
488.2
365.3
141.6
208.3
1,268.6
391.7
387.2
130.7
5,111.2

8,917
2,620
4,561
4,314
3,699
2,915
1,874
1,767
1,728
911.0

15,090
11,290
9,450
9,190
8,750
7,360
6,400
6,000
5,830
4,020

71.4
98.5
145.3

301.1
229.4
615.2

912.0
1511.0
695.0

3,840
3,520
2,940

477.3
9.1
4.0
32.7
9.3

2,930.0
29.3
11.7
164.5
18.0

462.0
706.0
754.7
411.0
271.0

2,840
2,800
2,200
2,070
520

Country and Human Development
GDP
(US$ billions)
Indicator Rank

7
9
26
17
28
29
30
111
35
43
58
65
74
106
72
104
85
120
112
127
145
121
109
160

United States (HI)
Japan (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
France (HI)
Singapore (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (UM)
South Africa (UM)
Poland (UM)
Chile (UM)
Malaysia (M)
Brazil (UM)
Thailand (M)
Iran (LM)
Romania (LM)
China (LM)
Philippines (LM)
Egypt (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
India (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Nicaragua (LI)
Vietnam (LI)
Tanzania (LI)

Source:
Column 1: World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC.; aggregates
calculated for the Human Development Report Office by the World Bank.
Column 2: World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC.; aggregates
calculated for the Human Development Report Office by the World Bank.
Column 3: calculated on the basis of GDP and population data from World Bank. 2003. World Development
Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC.; aggregates calculated for the Human Development Report Office by
the World Bank.
Column 4: World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators 2003. CD-ROM. Washington, DC.; aggregates
calculated for the Human Development Report Office by the World Bank.
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Figure 4.1. Wealth Effect (GDP) on Rights Performance
Human Development Index

Good Government Practices
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104
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Table 10.1. Correlation of Wealth and Measures of Development

Africa

Asia

Australia
and Pacific

Caribbean

Former
Soviet
Influence

Latin
America

Middle East

Western
Europe

Region

0.92**

0.88**

0.93**

0.97**

0.86**

0.97**

0.88**

0.93**

0.94**

0.93**
0.82**

0.87**
0.58**

0.92**
0.91**

0.98*
0.95**

0.89*
0.90**

0.97**
0.81**

0.90**
0.64**

0.92**
0.89**

0.83**
0.92**

0.77**

0.49**

0.90**

0.98**

0.92**

0.85**

0.69**

0.78**

0.91**

0.76**

0.55**

0.88**

0.96**

0.81**

0.83**

0.67**

0.77**

0.86**

0.62**

0.29

0.50*

0.94**

0.75*

0.73**

0.34

0.18

0.85**

-0.40**

-0.22

0.10

-0.25

-0.48*

174
41
19
6
10
20
20
N
Cell entries are Pearson’s R coefficients. Dependent variable is natural log of GDP per capita
*p < .05, **p < .01

15

Measure
All
Human
development
index (HDI) 2001
Gender-related
development
index (GDI) 2001
Rule of Law
Government
Effectiveness
Control of
Corruption
Voice and
Accountability
PTS 2002
(AI & State)

-0.42

-0.74

-0.71*

-0.21

23

Table 10.1 illustrates the relationship between per capita GDP and various measures of development, across all
countries and within regions. Across all countries the relationship is highly significant (p < .01), but the strength of
the correlation varies. The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is correlated strongly with per capita GDP (r =
.92), but physical integrity (PTS) bears a relatively weak correlation (r = -.40). If we square these coefficients to
compute r-square (as in regression), we can say that per capita GDP explains 85% of the variance in HDI across
countries, but only 16% of the variance in physical integrity. The same calculation can be made for the other
measures of development, which are ranked in declining order for all countries. Analysis of these variables within
regions indicates variation in the relationship between wealth and development, but the same pattern is still largely
evident. Where no relationship exists (e.g., Voice and Accountability in the Middle East) it is due to the lack of
variance within the region.
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Table 11.1: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Growth Rate
Annual Growth Rate
GDP per Capita (%)
Country
and
Human Development Indicator Rank

1975-2001

1990-2001

104

China (LM)

8.2

8.8

109

Vietnam (LI)

4.9

6.0

29

Taiwan (UM)

8.9

5.6

30
43
28
35

South Korea (UM)
Chile (UM)

127

India (LI)

6.2
4.1
5.1
..
3.2

4.7
4.7
4.4
4.4
4.0

58

Malaysia (M)

4.1

3.9

74
120

Thailand (M)
Egypt (LM)

112

Indonesia (LI)

5.4
2.8
4.3

3.0
2.5
2.3

26
7
106
17
65

Hong Kong (HI)
United States (HI)
Iran (LM)
France (HI)
Brazil (UM)
Japan (HI)

4.5
2.0
-0.6
1.7
0.8
2.6

2.1
2.1
2.0
1.5
1.4
1.0

Philippines (LM)
Tanzania (LI)
South Africa (UM)
Romania (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)

0.1
0.3
-0.7
-1.3
-4.0
0.2

1.0
0.4
0.2
-0.1
-0.1
-0.2

9
85
160
111
72
121
145

Singapore (HI)
Poland (UM)

Source:
World Bank. 2003. Correspondence on GDP per capita annual growth rates. March. Washington, DC; aggregates
calculated for the Human Development Report Office by the World Bank.
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